volume	19,	no.	35 august	2019 An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs Eleonore Neufeld University of Southern California © 2019 Eleonore	Neufeld This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019035/> Introduction1 On	New	Year's	Eve	2016,	the	Cologne	Police	Department	proudly	reported	via	Twitter	that	it	was	currently	screening	hundreds	of	"nafris" at	the	main	train	station	in	Cologne.2	The	label	'nafri',	used	by	the	police	to	refer	to	North	Africans,	had	its	(public)	linguistic	debut	in	this tweet, which was immediately followed by national moral outrage. Later,	when justifying the department's choice of	words, the police chief	claimed	that	"[i]t	is	undeniable	that	there	is	an	accumulation	of criminal	acts	by	persons	from	North	African	areas,	and	we	needed	to find	a	police-internal term for that".3 So	what	were	people so	upset about?	The	police	department	introduced	a	term	that	functions	to	convey	a	causal	link	between	membership	in	the	social	category	of	North Africans	and	criminal	behavior.	In	other	words,	they	introduced	a	term that	negatively essentialized	its	targets:	It	doesn't	only	attribute	criminal behavior	to	the	group,	it	also	says	that	members	of	the	group	have	this trait	in virtue of some North-African "nature". It	is	as	if	'nafri'	says:	"there is something about North-Africans	that	makes	them	criminal".	This,	as I	will	here	argue,	is	the	key	semantic	characteristic	of	slurs.	As	I	see	it, 1. Special thanks	to	Robin	Jeshion,	Mark	Schroeder,	and	Guillermo	Del	Pinal for	various	rounds	of	comments	on	earlier	drafts	of	the	paper	and	extremely helpful	conversations	on	its	topic.	Thanks	also	to	Gretchen	Ellefson,	Jennifer Foster, Paul Garofalo, John Hawthorne, Frank Hong, Caley Howland, Gabbrielle	M.	Johnson,	Zoë	Johnson	King,	Renee	Jorgensen	Bolinger,	Brian H.	Kim, Junhyo	Lee,	Ben	Lennertz,	Alex	Mavda,	Rachel	McKinney,	Daniel Pallies, Quyen Pham, Jack Samuel, Henry Schiller, Scott Soames, David Wallace	and	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	very	helpful	comments	on	earlier versions	of the	paper. I presented versions	of this paper at	USC,	Cal Poly Pomona,	the	University	of	Michigan,	the	ECAP.9	in	Munich,	the	2017	Pacific APA	meeting,	the	2017	ESPP	meeting,	the	2017	SPP	meeting,	the	Athena	in Action	2018,	and	the	GAP.10	in	Cologne.	I	am	grateful	to	those	audiences	for helpful	discussions. 2. The original German tweet reads: "#PolizeiNRW #Silvester2016 #SicherInKöln: Am	HBF	werden derzeit	mehrere	Hundert	Nafris überprüft. Infos folgen". Cf. http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/silvester-kontrollen-inkoeln-was-bitteschoen-ist-ein-nafri-a-1128172.html,	downloaded	01.01.2017. 3. German original: "Eine Häufung an Straftaten von Personen aus dem nordafrikanischen	Raum lasse sich	aber	nicht	bestreiten,	und	dafür	müsse dann polizeiintern auch ein Begriff gefunden werden" (http://www.zeit. de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-01/koeln-silvesternacht-polizei-nafritweet-racial-profiling,	downloaded	01.01.2017). eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) lexical	entry	of	kind	terms,	I	am	committed	to	a	conception	of	lexical representations	as	informationally	rich.	However,	instead	of	using	this paper to	debate foundational issues in lexical semantics, I	will	here simply	assume	this	framework	and	show	what	some	of	its	fruits	are.5 I	begin	by	giving	a	detailed	outline	of	my	theory.	Next,	I	introduce key	linguistic	desiderata	of	a	theory	of	the	meaning	of	slurs,	and	show that	my	theory	meets	all	of	them.	Finally,	I	present	evidence	from	cognitive	psychology	and	psycholinguistics	for	my	essentialist	account. §1 Slurs as Failed Kind Terms 1.1 The View The	main	thesis	of	this	paper	is	that	slurs	are	akin	to	natural	kind	terms. Under	the	framework	of	natural	kind	terms	that	I	am	assuming,	natural	kind	terms	are	introduced	to	designate	an	essence	that	is	explanatorily	connected	to	a	set	of	stereotypical	features	of	a	kind.	Slur	terms are	distinctive	because	they	designate6	an	essence	that	is	explanatorily connected	to	a	set	of	negative	stereotypical	features	of	a	social	group. Thus,	slurs	are	a	species	of	kind	terms	and	to	be treated	semantically	on	a	par	with terms	such	as 'water', 'gold',	or 'tiger'.	Scott	Soames (2007)	describes	natural	kind	terms	such	as	'water'	as	introduced	by the	following	schema: The	term	'water'	is	to	designate	the	unique	substance	of which (nearly) all members of the class of its paradigmatic	samples	are	instances.	Substances	are	explanatory kinds instances	of	which share the same	basic	physical 5. In	fact,	my	results	will	be	the	same	under	a	framework	of	natural	kind	terms according	to	which	they	rigidly	designate	an	essence	and	do	not	encode	any stereotypical	features.	Since	these	are	used	to	descriptively	fix	the	reference upon introduction of the kind term, the reference of slur terms will still be	empty,	but the	alleged	referents	will still	be	presupposed to	possess	an "essence"	with	negative	causal-dispositional	potential. 6. Throughout	the	paper,	I	do not use	'designate',	'refer',	and	cognate	expressions as success terms.	As has already become clear, the view defended in this paper	is	that	slurs	have	null-extension,	and	thus	do	not	designate	or	refer	to anything. slurs	are	kind	terms	encoding	an	"essence"	of	a	social	group,	which	is taken	to	explain	a	number	of	negative	features	attributed	to	the	group. In	effect,	then,	the	police	department	introduced	a	slur	for	people	from North	African countries into the	German language community, and people	were	rightly	upset	about	it. The	main	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	introduce	to	the	philosophical	debate	an	essentialist	theory	of	slurs	that	has,	to	my	knowledge,	not	yet been	given	adequate	consideration.	The	main	thesis	of this	paper is that	slurs4	are	a	species	of failed kind terms; they	are terms	which,	although	introduced	with	the	intention	of	designating	kinds,	fail	to	do so.	All recognized	properties	of slurs	are	derivable from	this simple semantic	base;	no	additional	linguistic	entities	need	to	be	posited	to account	for	the	special	features	of	slurring	vocabulary.	Although	the primary	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	motivate	an	essentialist	semantics	of slurs	rather	than	to	defeat	theoretical	alternatives,	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	I	take	my	essentialist	model	to	have	a	central	virtue	that	makes it	stand	out	from	competing	theories.	Namely,	that	it	can	account	for the	acknowledged	desiderata	of	an	adequate	semantics	of	slurs	while receiving	strong	support	from	empirical	work	in	cognitive	psychology. In	what	follows,	I	assume	a	theory	of	natural	kind	terms	according to	which	they	encode	an	essence	of	a	kind,	k,	that	is	explanatorily	connected	to	a	set	of	stereotypical	features	associated	with	k.	This	way	of carving	out the	semantics	of	natural	kind	terms	differs	slightly from the	classical	Kripkean	framework	of	natural	kind	terms.	Since I take descriptive	information	about	stereotypical	features	to	be	part	of	the 4. One	question	that	has	come	up	in	the	literature	on	slurs	is	how	to	delineate the class of slurs, and, relatedly, how to distinguish slurs from	other pejoratives	(see,	e.g.,	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	Bach,	2018;	Croom,	2011; Jeshion,	2013a;	Popa-Wyatt,	2016).	My	answer	to	this	question	has	direct	consequences for the scope	of	my theory.	Although I	agree	with	other theorists that	there	is	a	clear	distinction	between	paradigmatic	slurs	and	paradigmatic non-slurring	pejoratives	(e.g.,	so-called	"individual	pejoratives"	like	'jerk'	or 'asshole'),	I	disagree	with	them	by	holding	that	these	two	classes	lie	on	a	continuum	rather	than	being	clearly	definable.	Correspondingly,	the	boundary	of the	scope	of	my	theory	is	fuzzy.	In	the	section	on	derogatory	variation,	I	will show	how	the	mechanics	of	my	model	explain	why	there	are	middle	cases that	are	not	clearly	classifiable	into	either	category. eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) G	-	whatever that	essence	is	-	which	is	causally	responsible	for	stereotypical	negative	features	associated	with	G	and	predicted	of	P. Importantly,	the	claim	is	not	that	there	are essences	of	the	kind	mentioned.	Although	slurs	are	introduced	with	the	intention	of	designating natural	kinds,	in	most	cases,	they	actually	fail	to	do	so.	In	contrast	to 'water', 'gold'	or	'tiger',	there	obviously	will	be	no	underlying,	unified causal	explanation for the set	of (often inaccurate) stereotypical features	that	is	supposed	to	be	explained	by	the	essence	(see	also	Appiah, 1985;	1996;	Zack,	2002).	More	concretely,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a "gayness	essence"	which	disposes	male	homosexuals	to	carry	HIV	or dress	stylishly.	There	is	no	such	thing	as	a	"blackness	essence"	which causes	black	people	to	deal	drugs	or	receive	welfare.	Thus,	the	semantic	contents	of	slurring	words	are	empty. I	will	now	break	down	the	structure	of	slur	concepts	into	three	core elements	that,	according	to	the	view	I	am	advocating	here, together constitute a theory-like representation encoded in those concepts.8 The	central element	of a slur is the causal component: the intrinsic "hidden	unobservable" that	explains	and	gives	rise to the	superficial, stereotypically	observable	features	and	actions	of	members	of	the	social	category	in	question.	It	is	this	causally	deep	component	that	we call	the	"essence".	These	"essences"	are	to	be	thought	of	as	the	intrinsic, "underlying	natures that	make them	the thing that they	are" (Medin, 1989,	p.	1476),	or	as	an	object's	"underlying	reality	or	true	nature	that one	cannot	observe	directly	but	that	gives	an	object	its	identity,	and	is responsible	for	other	similarities	that	category	members	share"	(Gelman,	2004,	p. 404). Importantly, the	essence	can,	but	does	not	have to	be,	represented	as	being	biologically	grounded.	In	fact,	it	does	not have to be known	what exactly the essence is. Rather, essentialism can	be thought	of as "a 'placeholder'	notion:	one	can	believe that	a 8. In the course of the paper, I often use the terms 'term' and 'concept' interchangeably.	This	is	because	I	take	the	view	for	granted	according	to	which terms inherit their linguistic	meaning	directly from internally individuated lexical	concepts,	which	I	understand	as	the	smallest	constituents	of	thought and	primary	bearers	of	meaning. constitution, which in turn explains their most salient characteristics	-	in the case of water samples, the fact that they boil and freeze at certain temperatures, that they	are	clear,	potable,	and	necessary	to	life,	etc.	Hence, the	predicate	'is	water'	will	apply	(at	a	world-state)	to	precisely	those	quantities	that	have	the	physical	constitution which,	at	the	actual	world-state,	explains	the	salient	features	of	(nearly)	all	paradigmatic	water-samples.	(Soames, 2007,	p.	2) 'Water' hence, designates whatever underlying physical characteristic	-	call it "essence"	-	is shared	by	all 'water'-members	and	explains and	gives	rise	to	the	paradigmatic	features	of	water.	Similarly,	I	maintain	that	the	N-word	is	used	to	designate	a	"blackness	essence"	-	whatever	that	is	-	which	is	causally	responsible	for	and	explains	negative features	stereotypically	associated	with	being	black.	'Faggot'	is	true	of those	people	who	share	the	"gay	essence"	-	whatever	that	is	-	which is	causally	responsible	for	and	explains	stereotypical	negative	features associated	with	gay	persons.7 In	general, slur	concepts	encode	minitheories	which	represent	an	essence-like	element	that	is	causally	connected	to	a	set	of	negatively-valenced	stereotypical	features	associated with	a	social	group.	The	truth-conditional	contribution	of	slur	nouns can	then	be	captured	by	the	following	schema:	For	a	given	slur	S	of	a social	group	G	and	a	person	P,	S	is	true	of	P	iff	P	bears	the	"essence"	of 7. After	the	term	has	been	introduced	into	a	language	community,	it	is	possible that some stereotypes associated with a slur change. For example, at the time	of	introduction	of	'faggot',	the	"gayness	essence"	wasn't	taken	to	explain the	feature	of	carrying	HIV,	a	negative	stereotypical	feature	now	associated with the slur, since the slur predates the discovery of the virus. In these cases,	we	simply	discover	more features	to	be	caused	by	the	essence	(just	as with	other	natural	kind	terms),	and	update	the	concept	accordingly.	Insofar as	the	updated	concept is	sufficiently	similar,	concept identity is	preserved (see	section	1.3).	Note,	however,	that	the	focus	of	this	paper	is	on	lexical,	not diachronic, semantics.	Diachronic phenomena, such as acquisition, lexical transition	from	non-slurring	to	slurring	meaning,	meaning	identity	over	time, or	appropriation	have	to	be	addressed	in	a	separate	paper. eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) essentialized	group	share	one	or	another	subset	of	those	features.	But what's	decisive for	belonging	to	the	essentialized	group	is	the	presence of the shared underlying "essence" or "hidden nature". This nature causally	disposes	the	subject	to	exhibit	the	negative	surface	features, whether	or	not	they	actually	display	them	at	any	given	moment. As	the	first	and	second	component	don't	stand	in	an	accidental,	but in	a	causal-nomological relation to	one	another,	we	need	a third	semantic	component	to	capture	this	special	relation.	This	element	is	a representation	of	this	very	causal,	law-like	relationship.	This	relationship	is	crucial	for	the	informational	organization	of	the	category	that	is represented	in	our	concept,	since	it	relates	the	essence	and	the	stereotypical	features	of	the	social	reference	group	in	a	way	that	is	not	merely arbitrary	or	correlational,	but	grounded	in	causal	laws. The immensely derogatory, toxic power of slur terms and their distinctively	racist (or	xenophobic,	homophobic,	sexist,	etc.)	content directly	derives from the	outlined	semantics.	When the racist, xenophobe,	or	homophobe	applies	a	slur,	he	thereby	makes	the	target	in question	-	and anyone who "shares the same essence"	-	part	of	the	minitheory,	subjugating	her	to	a	form	of	causal	determinism	and	thereby depriving	her	of	human	autonomy	and	self-determination.	How	the targets	are	disposed	to	act	is,	in	the	eyes	of	the	slur	user,	determined and	consequently importantly	constrained	by	the	causally	potent	essence.	Members	of	the	targeted	group	are	thus	not	evaluated	by	their individual	acts	or	in	relation	to	their	environmental	circumstances,	but by	(pre-)determined	membership	in	a	group.11	Crucially,	the	attributed essence	is	seen	as	disposing	their	bearers	to	act	badly, or	to	exhibit	negative features.	Thus,	by	carrying	the	relevant	"group	essence",	a	black or	gay	person is	always	predisposed to, for	example,	exhibit	certain traits	or	behaviors	-	even	if	all	available	evidence	indicates	otherwise. Taken	together,	it	is	easy	to	see	how	the	application	of	an	essentialized 11. See	Basu	(2019)	for	a	recent	argument	that	epistemically	representing	others in	a	way	that	treats	them	as	scientific	objects-i.e.,	essentializes	them-constitutes	a	case	of	wronging. category	possesses	an	essence	without	knowing	what	the	essence	is" (Gelman,	2004,	p.	404;	see	also	Medin	&	Ortony,	1989).9 The	second	component	comprises	stereotype	features	of	the	reference	group	that, in	contrast to	ordinary	natural	kind	terms,	must	be represented	as	negative.	These	features	provide	a	heuristic	for	the	identification	of	individuals	of	the	essentialized	group.	That	is,	the	observable	surface	features	-	which	are,	in	the	eyes	of	the	racist,	xenophobe, or homophobe, dominantly negative10	-	deliver a reliable indicator for	the	presence	of	the	causally	powerful	essence.	And	since	they	are caused	by	the	essential	property	in	question,	it	is	assumed	that	members	of	the	class	have	an	inherent	disposition	to	exhibit	those	features. Thus,	it	is	assumed	that	most,	but	not	necessarily	all,	individuals	of	an 9. Thus,	the	notion	of	"essentialism"	that	I	operate	with	is	the	one	that	is	used in	the	literature	on	psychological	essentialism	(Gelman,	2003;	Haslam	et	al., 2004;	Medin	&	Ortony,	1989),	which,	in	the	philosophical	literature,	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	"quintessentialism"	(Leslie,	2013). 10. The	negativity-aspect	of	the	theory	raises	an	important	question:	What	does it take for a feature to be negative? Generally, I take a quasi-subjectivist stance	on	this	matter:	A	feature	is	negative	when	it	is	represented	as	negative by	a	sufficient	number	of	subjects.	Under	this	conception,	negativity	is	highly context-sensitive.	Even	if	a	feature	is	generally	seen	as	positive	or	neutral,	it can	become	negative	in	certain	contexts.	For	example,	while	+having	high sat	scores	or	+dressing	stylishly	are,	in	and	by	themselves,	positive	qualities, they are evaluated as threatening and	negative	when combined	with certain	social	outgroups	as	in	the	first	example,	or	certain	genders	as	in	the latter.	Similarly,	many	encoded	features,	such	as	skin	tone	or	facial	configuration,	will	be	objectively	absolutely	valence-free,	but	can	either	be	encoded	as proxies	for	other	negative	features	and	thus	themselves	become	represented as	negative,	or	be	irrationally	encoded	as	negative	in	the	first	place. A	reviewer	also	pointed	out	to	me	that	the	negativity-aspect	of	my	proposed semantics	might	create	a	problem	in	accounting	for	sentences	such	as	"I'm hopeless	at	fashion.	I	wish	I	knew	some	fag	who	could	just	tell	me	how	to dress	to	attract	the	ladies",	which	should	come	out	infelicitous	under	my	account,	since	it	is	used	to	ascribe	and	explain	properties	the	speaker	takes	to be	positive.	However, I	do	not think this is correct.	We	often	use	negative properties of others to our favor, as in: "I'm in love	with this	woman, but she	has	a	husband.	I	wish	I	knew	some	criminal,	bad	person	who	could	help me	get rid	of	my	problem."	This is	perfectly	coherent,	despite the fact that +criminal	or	+bad	are	negative	properties	and	the	speaker	represents	them to	be	negative-the	speaker	just	uses	these	negative	properties	to	his	favor. For	a	persuasive	response	to	a	similar	objection	by	Camp	(2013),	see	Jeshion (2018). eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) the	full	spectrum	of	human	autonomy	and	self-determination	that	we associate	with	personhood.12 1.2 Some Helpful Contrasts One	of the	most important things to	emphasize is that	on	my	view, slur	terms	are	not synonymous	with	their	neutral	counterparts.	In	fact, my account of slurs doesn't appeal to the	meaning of their neutral counterparts	at	all. 'Gay',	'Jew',	or	'Hispanic'	are	governed	by	conventions	that	crucially	differ	from	'faggot', 'kike',	or 'spic'.	Much	research confirms	that	race	concepts	are	highly	essentialized,	an	issue	we	will later	cover	in	more	detail.	But	although	'gay',	'Jew',	or	'Hispanic'	can	be represented	as	socially	essentialized	categories	that	"share	a	common nature"	and	facilitate	(especially	negative)	generalizations	(cf.	Dovidio, Glick,	&	Rudman,	2005;	Gelman,	2003;	Haslam	&	Levy,	2006;	Haslam, Rothschild,	&	Ernst,	2000;	Hirschfeld,	1996;	Leslie,	2017;	Pauker,	Ambady,	&	Apfelbaum,	2010;	Prentice	&	Miller,	2007), the	meaning	of the	nouns	that	refer	to	those	categories	is	still	much	more	innocuous, both	with	regard	to its	causal	determinism	and	the	stereotypes they encode. First,	even	if	we	say	that	slurs'	neutral	counterparts	are	sometimes essentialized,	I	contend	that	the	essence	referred	to	by,	say,	'chink'	is not identical to the essence of 'Chinese'. Also under the assumption that ethnic labels sometimes function as kind terms, the kind they designate	differs	from	the	kind	their	closest	slur-relative	designates.	I merely	chose	'Chinese	essence'	as	a	label	for	the	essence	placeholder that	unifies,	in	the	eyes	of	the	racist,	the	alleged	referents	of	the	slur;	I could	as	well	have	called	it	'chinkness	essence'.	Second,	even	persons whose	representation	of races	or	ethnicities is	very	essentialized	do 12. Remember	that	although	slurs	are	a	species	of	kind	terms,	they	possess	a	feature	that	distinguishes them	from	classic	natural	kind	terms	as	'water',	'gold',	or 'tiger'.	In	the	case	of	'water',	the	essence	in	question	is	explanatorily	connected to	the	salient	features	of	paradigmatic	instances	of	water;	"that	they	boil	and freeze	at	certain	temperatures,	that	they	are	clear,	potable,	and	necessary	to life"	(Soames,	2007).	The	valence	of the	salient features is	completely irrelevant.	In	the	case	of	slurs,	in	contrast,	the	essence	must	be	connected	to	negative stereotypes	of	the	social	group	in	question. slur	term	is	derogating,	demeaning,	and	dehumanizing	to	the	target and	the	entire	social	group	she	is	a	member	of	(cf.	fig.	1). Consider	again	the	analogous	behavior	of	other	concepts	corresponding	to	kind	terms,	e.g.,	the	natural	kind	concept	kangaroo.	We	know from cognitive and developmental psychology that young children think that kangaroos that grow up with goats will nevertheless be good	at	hopping.	We	act	as	if	kangaroos	are	just made to	hop	(Gelman, 2004;	Gelman	&	Wellman, 1991).	So just	as	a	kangaroo	cannot lose its "kangaroohood" if it is raised in	a	goat family,	and is	dispositionally	"made"	to	hop	even	if it	doesn't	do	so	(cf. for	an	empirical	overview	Gelman,	2003;	2004),	so	are	the	members	of	the	social	groups in question not evaluated by their individual circumstances or selfdetermined	acts	and	decisions.	This	is	precisely	what	is	responsible	for the	dehumanizing	power	of	slurs,	as	the	attribution	of	"essences"	that pre-determine	the	target's	dispositions,	character	traits,	attitudes,	and behaviors	creates	a	picture	of	the	target	according	to	which	she	lacks group essence eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) feature	lists;	rather,	they	encode	information	in	a	way	that	is	causally organized.	In	particular,	slurs	relate	prototypical	features	nomologically to	causally	powerful	essences.14	As	we	will	see	in	the	next	sections,	the causal	elements	explanatorily	differentiate	my	account	from	Croom's, for	they	lead	to	a	number	of	distinct	linguistic	and	psychological	predictions	about	phenomena	such	as	derogatory	variation,	essentialism about	social	groups,	or	nominalization.	Most	importantly,	the	causal elements	play a crucial role in ensuring that slurs	will come	out as empty,	as	there	is	and	will	be	no	"deep	essence"	that	explains	features associated	with	a	group,	even if the stereotypes, due to effects of structural disadvantages, might accurately represent certain members of oppressed groups.15 According	to	Camp's	perspectival	account	of	slurs,	"slurs	make	two distinct,	coordinated	contributions	to	a	sentence's	conventional	communicative	role:	a	truth-conditional	predication	of	group	membership, and	endorsement	of	a	derogating	perspective	on	that	group"	(Camp, 2018,	p.	30).	In	virtue	of	the	second	speech-act,	a	speaker	signals	their allegiance	to	a	perspective16	according	to	which	the	target's	group	membership	is	explanatory	of	many	of	her	other	properties,	and	predicts	the 14. For defenses of causally-structured models of concepts and criticisms of purely	feature-based	models	of	conceptual	representation,	see	Danks,	2014; Gelman,	2003;	Murphy,	2004;	Rehder,	2017;	Sloman,	2005;	Sloman,	Love,	& Ahn,	1998. 15. Notice another difference: To explain the relationship between neutral counterparts	and	slurs,	Croom	posits	a	"conceptual	anchor",	individuated	by the	prototype	property	with	the	largest	feature	weight.	These	features	have a	"grounding	role"	insofar	as	they	"serve	as	salient	anchors	for	the	semantic or conceptual content of slurs" (Croom, 2015, p. 35). Although properties corresponding to the neutral counterpart will often have high inductive weight	and	thereby	explain	the	relationship	between	slurs	and	paradigmatic targets, these features, on my account, do not "ground" or "anchor" the meaning	of	slurs,	just	like	+wet	does	not	ground	the	meaning	of	'water'. 16. Camp	characterizes	a	perspective	as	"an	intuitive	tool	for	structuring	thoughts: a	disposition	to	notice,	explain,	and	respond	to	some	part	of	the	world	in	certain	ways.	Perspectives	in	general	may,	but	need	not,	include	any	particular propositional	or	attitudinal	commitments;	and	they	are	partly,	but	only	partly, under	voluntary	control"	(Camp,	2018,	p.	30). not	have	to	conceptualize	these	racial	essences	as	causally	linked	to negative properties	in	order	to	be	competent	with	the	race	or	ethnicity terms. They	can	believe	in	a	"hidden	nature"	of	races	while	not	believing	that	the	features	caused	by	this	nature	are	mostly	negative.	Thirdly, the	convention	governing,	e.g.,	racial	terms	generally	permits	higher degrees	of causal innocence than the linguistic conventions	governing	slur	terms.	This	means	that	it is	not necessary in	order	to	be	competent	with the term 'Chinese' to	encode that instances	of this	kind share	a	causal	essence	that	pre-disposes	them	to	behave	in	negative ways.	It	is	possible	to	refer	to	people	with	a	Chinese	background	in	a neutral	manner	that	does not	essentialize	them.	In	fact,	many	contexts require	even	the	racist	or	homophobe	to	be	aware	of	a	non-essentialist	convention	that	is	endorsed	in	the	case	of	racial,	ethnic,	or	sexual vocabulary.13 To	explain	the	mechanics	of	my	view,	it	is	helpful	to	draw	contrasts to	some	other,	superficially	similar,	views.	My	account	bears	similarities	to	the	hybrid	family-resemblance	account	by	Adam	Croom	(2011; 2014a;	2015)	and	the	perspectival	account	by	Elisabeth	Camp	(2013; 2018).	According to	Croom, slurs contain both an expressive and a descriptive	component,	the	latter	of	which	consists	of	a	list	of	weighed prototypical	features.	Since	the	prototypical	features	encoded	by	slurs and	their	neutral	counterparts	differ,	it	follows	that	they	are	not	truthconditionally equivalent.	Although	my account, like	Croom's, treats slurs	as informationally	rich, there	are	a	number	of important	differences	between	them.	Under	my	account,	slurs	do	not	merely	encode 13. Consider, for instance, the conventions	governing legal contexts.	Here,	occurrences	of	social	group	terms	such	as	'homosexual'	have	a	purely	descriptive	meaning	whose	referents	can	be	determined	by	a	fixed	set	of	criteria.	In this	case,	it	would	be	something	akin	to	'everyone	that	has	same-sex	preferences	or	engages	in	same-sex	behavior'.	As	a	result,	a	racist	or	homophobe would	have	to	comprehend	the	neutral-descriptive	meaning	attached	to	the neutral	counterparts	in	order	to	be	competent	with	the	terms.	In	contrast,	to fully	master	a	slur	word,	"successful	application"	requires	one	to	tacitly	understand	the	causal	story	between	some	essence	and	negative	stereotypes	that	I here	outlined.	In	contrast	to	the	convention	of	their	neutral	counterparts,	the convention	governing slurs	does not leave open the	possibility of a causallyneutral	application. eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) will	be	either	true	or	false	of	you.	It	is	precisely	because	of	the	purely predicative	function	that	slurs	come	out	as	empty. 1.3 Objections Before	we	move	on,	let	me	respond	to	a	salient	objection	against	the proposed	model,	namely	that	it	is	too	informationally	demanding	for competent	language	speakers.	Two	worries	of	this	type	seem	particularly	concerning.	First,	two	people	can	plausibly	employ	a	slur	in	communication	without talking past each other, although each of them associates	different	stereotypes	with	it.	Second,	someone	can	be	competent	with	a	slur	without	knowing	the	stereotype	associated	with	it. In	the	slurs	literature,	these	worries	have	been	spelled	out	by	Robin Jeshion	and	Elisabeth	Camp	(Camp,	2013;	Jeshion,	2013b).	However, it	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	they	are	in	fact	versions	of	familiar, more	general	worries	about	rich	views	of	lexical	meaning	that	often come	up	outside	of	the	slurs	debate,	such	as	in	discussion	of	inferential role	or	prototype	theories	of	concepts	(Fodor,	1998;	Fodor	&	Lepore, 1992;	Rey,	1983). The	main	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	assume	a	specific	account	of	lexical	meaning	as	richly	structured	and	argue	that	it	helps	us	explain	certain	patterns	that	are	unique	to	slurs.	The	background	semantic	framework	I	assume	is	a	live	option	in	current	debates	about	the	nature	of meaning	and	conceptual	structure.18	So	although	I	will	briefly	respond to	the	objections	that	have	come	up	against	treating	slurs	along	these lines,	the	appropriate	locus	for	a	full	response	to	these	objections	is in another paper discussing the general viability of this approach to meaning	and	concepts. 18. Issues regarding the richness of conceptual structure and its intersection with	linguistic	competence	constitute	an	object	of	ongoing,	vivid	discussion in	philosophy	and	the	cognitive	sciences	(see	Block,	1987;	Del	Pinal,	2016; 2018;	Fodor,	1998;	2005;	Fodor	&	Pylyshyn,	2014;	Gärdenfors,	2000;	Harman, 1993;	Jönsson,	2017;	Kamp	&	Partee,	1995;	Knobe,	Prasada,	&	Newman,	2013; Lakoff,	1987;	Leslie,	2015;	Marconi,	1997;	Prinz,	2012;	Putnam,	1975;	Soames, 2015;	Taylor,	2009). display	of	negative	stereotypical	properties.	This	second	speech-act	is similar	in	spirit	to	the	semantics	I	propose	here. Despite	these	similarities,	there	are	key	differences	between	our	accounts.	Perhaps	most	importantly,	I	only	posit	one,	purely	predicative, speech-act to explain the semantics of slurs. As the pure truth-conditional	attribution	of	neutral	counterpart	group	membership	doesn't play any role on	my account,	Camp's first, predicational speech-act comes	out	as	explanatorily	redundant	on	my	account.	As	a	result	of this	difference,	the	accounts	diverge	with	regard	to	some	key	linguistic predictions,	which	we	will	assess	in	the	next	section.	As	with	Croom, one	of the	crucial	predictive	differences is that	predications	of slurs always	come	out	false	under	my	account,	whereas	they	often	come	out as	true	for	the	predicative	speech-act	component	of	Camp's	account.17 But	also	the	second,	perspectival	speech-act	does	not	do	what	slurs do	under	my	construal.	According	to	Camp's	characterization	of	this second	speech-act,	"slurs	are	akin	to	other	expressions	[like	'tu'/'vous' or	slang	expressions	for	parents,	food,	or	genitals],	part	of	whose	conventional	function	is	not	merely	to	refer	or	predicate,	but	to	signal	the speaker's social, psychological, and/or emotional relation to that semantic	value"	(Camp,	2013,	p.	335);	thus,	slurs	contribute	"a (broadly) expressive, perspectival element to the conversation"	(my	emphasis;	Camp, 2018,	p.	48).	The	latter	quote	is	instructive:	The	second	speech-act	is broadly	expressive,	because	it	is	about the	speaker's	perspective	on	a referent. In contrast, although they can reveal something about	my perspective	-	just	as	calling	a	chair	"sofa"	can	reveal	something	about my	perspective	on	the	chair	-	slurs	are	not	about perspectives	on	my account.	In	my	view,	slurs'	meaning	is	predicative	in	the	full-fledged, traditional	sense.	What	slurs	say of	you	is	that	you	have	some	group	essence	that	disposes	you	to	display	bad	features;	thus,	a	slur-predication 17. Another	difference is that	Camp	explicitly rejects that	slurs,	generally, conventionally encode stereotypes.	However, because she suspects that some slurs	do	encode	stereotypes,	I	will	treat	this	difference	as	not	too	important (see	Camp,	2013). eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) it,	what	they	are	like,	and	I	don't	care.	I	just	think	those queers	should	be	locked	up."	(Jeshion,	2013b,	p.	322) Assuming	that	the	intuition	Jeshion	capitalizes	on	is	generalizable,20 the	essentialist	theory	has	the	resources	to	account	for	it.	The	speaker in (1) has to	do	quite some	work and introduce a variety	of qualifications to	get their intended,	minimal	meaning	of 'queer'	across.	Although the speaker rejects many stereotypes, one surface property that the	speaker	regards	as	highly	negative is left,	which they	make salient	through	"anyone	who	would	do that is	sick".	According	to	my theory,	the	context	of	utterance	makes	it	clear	that	the	speaker	means to	pick	out	someone	who	bears	the	"queerness	essence",	which	makes the	person	inherently	sick	and	causally	explains	the	property	of	samesex	behavior,	which, in	the	eyes	of the	speaker, is	clearly	negative.21 And	although	we	can	make	sense	of	this	contextually	modified	case	in a	way	fully	compatible	with	the	essentialist	theory,	the	standing	meaning	of	'queer'	will	still	be	one	that	fully	corresponds	to	the	semantics I	propose	-	i.e.,	one	in	which	more	than	only	the	minimal	stereotype is	communicated. 20.	As	has	been	pointed	out	before	(Camp,	2013),	it	is	unclear	how	uniform	the intuitions	about	(1)	are,	and	thus	whether	our	theory	should	accommodate this data point. I, for one, have extreme difficulties making sense of (1), especially	if	schematically	replaced	with	other	slurs.	Here's	one	reason	that might explain	my	difficulty. It seems to	be a true	generalization that slurs emerge	in	communities	that	interact	with	the	people	they	are	slurring.	This is	why	slurs	are	often	fairly	meaningless	to	people	who	are	from	cultures	or communities	that	are	not	in	touch	with	the	slurred	group	in	question.	But	if this is true, it	will	also	be true that,	due to interaction	with	slurred	groups, these	communities	and	competent	users	within	them will	have	stereotypes of	these	members.	It	is	therefore	fairly	difficult	to	imagine	that	anyone	who is	competent	with	a	slur	could	utter	something	like	(1).	Notice	that	Jeshion herself	goes	on	to	explain	that	"[m]uch	racism	and	bigotry	is	rooted	simply on finding others 'different'-often because of physical characteristics" (p. 322).	+different	or	+physical	characteristic	c,	however,	are	stereotypical properties of the same status as the stereotypes Jeshion dismisses as semantically	encoded	(e.g.,	+sexually	promiscuous). 21. And	possibly	a	number	of	other	negative	properties	that	the	speaker	leaves open. A	number	of	philosophers	and	cognitive	scientists	have	presented convincing	replies to the	first	worry (see,	e.g.,	Chomsky,	2000;	Harman,	1993;	Marconi,	1997;	Smith,	Medin,	&	Rips,	1984).	Their	strategy emphasizes that,	holding the level	of competence	fixed,	similarity of conceptual content	is	all	we	need	to	explain	the	stability	of	meaning	between	different	speakers,	and,	for	that	matter,	communicative	success. More	concretely, if the	mental concepts that two	speakers	associate with	a	word	are	sufficiently	similar,	we	would	expect	that	information exchange,	in	most	cases,	proceeds	smoothly.19	Appealing	to	high	similarity	instead	of	strict	identity	also	explains	the	fact	that	we	sometimes miscommunicate	or	are	in	disagreement	about	the	extension	of	a	given term in	borderline	cases. If the	meaning	of	every	word type	was strictly	identical	between	each	competent	speaker,	these	phenomena would	become	a	mystery.	Thus,	modeling	meaning	stability	in	terms of content similarity	allows for communicative success	and	exceeds the	descriptive	accuracy	of	a	strict	identity	view.	This	point	can	directly be	applied	to	slurs.	Due	to	similarity	of	content,	communication	will proceed	"smoothly"	in	most	cases.	Only	in	rare	borderline	cases,	communication	between	two	subjects	might	be	unsuccessful. Let	us	turn	to	the	second	worry.	Is	it	possible	to	be	competent	with the	meaning	of	a	slur	and	not	have	knowledge	of	any	associated	stereotype?	According to Jeshion, someone	can	coherently	and	competently	utter (1)	"I	disdain	those	queers;	anyone	who	would	do	that	is sick.	But	I	do	not	endorse	those	[stereotypes]	as	the	right way	of thinking	about	queers. I	have	no idea	who	does 19. This	point	is	quite	important	and	often	neglected	in	discussions	of	conceptions of	meaning	that	appeal	to	stereotypes.	It	belongs	to	the	operationalization	of a	stereotype	that	it is highly stable:	Something	is	a	stereotype	only if it is highly stable in	a	population. If there	was	no	cross-subject	stability,	we	would	not call	a	given	property	a stereotype.	Relatedly, if stereotypes	allowed for	high variability,	we	would	not	get	reliable	and	replicable	effects	in	experimental paradigms and hence wouldn't be able to find any stereotype effects in controlled settings-but we do. Also detrimental phenomena such as the stereotype	threat	would	not	be	very	worrisome	if	the	associations	triggered were	as	variable	across	subjects	as	is	suggested	by	the	objection. eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) linguistic	community,	she	will	be	disposed	to	update	her	entry	for	the slur	if	she	takes	her	interlocutors	to	be	linguistic	authorities. §2: Slurs in Natural Language Having presented the view, I will now demonstrate its explanatory reach. Slurs exhibit unique linguistic patterns that have proven difficult	to	capture.	However,	since	these	data	are	acknowledged	as	explanatorily central for a successful theory	of slurs, any adequate account	must	have	the	resources	to	explain	them.	The	data	include:	(1) G-extending, (2)	G-contracting, and (3)	G-referencing uses of slurs (Croom,	2015;	Jeshion,	2013a),	(4)	non-derogatory,	non-appropriated uses	of	slurs	(Hom,	2008;	Jeshion,	2013a),	(5)	intuitions	about	null-extension	and	falsehood	(Hom,	2008;	Hom	&	May,	2013;	Richard,	2008; Sennet	&	Copp,	2015),	(6)	projection	behavior	(Anderson	&	Lepore, 2013;	Camp,	2013;	2018;	Cepollaro	&	Stojanovic,	2016;	Jeshion,	2013b; Potts,	2007)	and	(7)	derogatory	variation	of	slurs	(Bolinger,	2017;	Hom, 2008;	Jeshion,	2013a;	Nunberg,	2018;	Popa-Wyatt,	2016).	In	what	follows,	I	will	go	through	these	linguistic	phenomena	and	demonstrate that	the	essentialist	theory	can	handle	them	in	a	direct,	non-stipulative way. (1) G-extending Uses of Slurs Imagine	the	following	sentence	as	uttered	by	a	high	school	student	to describe	his	classmate	John,	who	doesn't	like	sports	and	has	interests in	art: (2)	"John	is	not	gay,	but	he	is	still	a	faggot." Similarly,	we	can	imagine	another	high	school	student	rejecting	(3a), yet	accepting	(3b): (3)	a.	"John	is	gay." b.	"John	is	a	faggot." The	first	thing	to	notice	here	is	that	intuitively,	it	seems	to	be	perfectly Drawing on Putnam's division of linguistic labor (Putnam, 1975), we	can	furthermore	appeal	to	partial	linguistic	competence	and	deference	to	experts	to	accommodate	Jeshion's	worry.	Can	we	say	of	Putnam	that	he	is	linguistically	competent	with	the	word	'elm',	even	if	his associated	prototypes	of	'elm'	and	'beech'	are	identical?	In	some	sense, yes:	He	knows	that	'elm'	is	a	natural	kind	term	and	designates	some "elm	essence"	that	explains	common	properties	of	elms.	He	will	not	be at	total	loss	in	linguistic	discourse	about	elms,	and	he	will	have	an	idea about	the	reference	of	the	term	when	elms	are	nearby.	He	himself	will also	be	able	to	apply	the	term	correctly	in	many	circumstances.	However,	Putnam	also	knows	that	there	are	degrees of competence,	and	that there	are	'elm'	experts	in	his	linguistic	community	whose	referential and	inferential	competence	with	the	term	exceeds	his.	Thus,	Putnam is	disposed	to	take	the	'elm'	expert	as	a	linguistic	authority	when	the circumstances	require,	and	revise	his	concept	in	accordance	with	the expert's	more	fine-grained	one.	Although	Putnam	can	be	said to	be competent	with	the	word	'elm',	he	certainly	does	not	have	the	expert's degree	of	linguistic	competence. This	point	can	be	applied	to	(1).	Suppose	that	a	speaker	is	ignorant of the stereotype speakers associate	with the slur.	All she knows is that	it	is	used	towards	people	with	the	surface	property	+homosexual. Can	we	say	that	she	is	competent	with	the	slur?	Again,	in	some	sense, yes.	Since	she	knows	that	the	term	is	a	slur,	she	knows	that	it	denotes an	essence	that	must	explain	the	feature	+homosexual	and	some	other	features.	Thus,	in	many	circumstances,	she	will	be	able	to	use	the term	appropriately,	including	to	draw	the	right	inferences	from	it	and pick out its intended referents. But again, since competence comes in	degrees,	we	wouldn't	say	that	the	speaker	is	fully competent:	There will	be	situations	in	which	she	will	be	confused	about	the	referent	of the	word	-	for	example,	in	cases	in	which	the	intended	referent	of	a more	competent	user	does	not	engage	in	same-sex	behavior,	but	exhibits other stereotypes that license inference to the essence. Since the speaker	also	knows that there	are "experts"	of the term in their eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) My	essentialist	theory	can	handle	the	examples	in	(2)	and	(3)	quite smoothly.	Consider	the	homophobe	uttering	(2).	Since	in	my	theory, slurs	are	not	synonymous	with	their	neutral	counterparts,	a	contradiction	is	not	predicted.	This	would	only	be	so	if	the	application	of	the slur	would	entail the	application	of 'having	homosexual	preferences'. But	attribution	of	the	slur	term	does	not imply	attribution	of	the	neutral counterpart term.	Recall	fig.	1:	+negative stereotype	x is	only	a	surface	feature	of	the	underlying	"group	essence"	cause.	Thus,	the	deep and	hidden	"gay	essence"	and	the	superficially	instantiated	feature	of homosexual	preferences	have	crucially	different	causal	roles.	While	it certainly	has	important	stereotypical	weight,	it	is	possible	to	cancel	the feature	of	homosexual	preferences,	as	long	as	the	non-changing	"gay essence",	in	the	eyes	of	the	slur	user,	"stays	present".	This	is	precisely what	happens in (2).	The	homophobe's concept	of 'faggot' encodes a	mini-theory,	according to	which the	unobservable	causal	property of	a	"gay	essence"	causes	and	explains	observable,	negative	features. These	stereotypical	features,	in	turn,	are	the	observational	heuristics the	homophobe	uses	to	"spot"	the	"gay	essence".	Since	John	presumably	exhibits	enough	of those	features, the	speaker	uttering	(2)	"efficiently"	expresses	that	John,	although	not	in	the	extension	of	gay	people,	shares	some	gayness	"essence"	that	causes	him	to	exhibit	negative traits	correlated	with	gayness	and	thus	falls	under	the	extension	of	the slur. Jeshion (2013a) dubs cases such as the ones in (2) and (3)	-	in which	the	slur	is	applied	to	a	target	that	doesn't	belong	to	the	group paradigmatically associated with the slur	-	"G-extending" uses of slurs.24	Some theorists	have tried to	explain	away	G-extending	uses by	stipulating	that	they	are	non-literal	(e.g.,	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013; Jeshion,	2013a);	therefore,	a	theory	of	slurs	need	not	account	for	these uses.	However,	none	of these theorists	has	offered	an	argument that shows that these	uses	are	non-literal.	The	usual	move is to	point to 24. In	her	extremely	insightful	analysis	of	the	linguistic	behavior	of	slurs,	Jeshion (2013a)	introduces	the	distinction	between	G-referencing,	G-extending,	and G-retracting	uses	of	slurs. possible	to	utter	(2)	(or	or	to	disagree	to	(3a)	yet	accept	(3b),	for	that matter)	-	intuitively, it	does	not	express	any	contradiction.22	However, if 'gay	man'	and 'faggot'	were truth-conditionally	equivalent,	as is defended	in	many	prominent	accounts	on	slurs,	(2)	should	express	a semantic	contradiction	that	can	only	be	"rescued"	pragmatically.	For example,	Anderson	and	Lepore's	minimalist analysis treats slurs' semantic	content	to	be	exhausted	by	the	truth-conditional	content	of	the neutral	counterpart	(Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013).	Also	Jeshion's	expressivist	account	treats	slurs'	truth-conditional	contribution	to	be	equivalent	to	the	truth-conditional	contribution	of	the	neutral	counterpart; an	expressive	element	of	contempt	is	added	to	account	for	the	derogatory properties of slurs (Jeshion, 2013a). And as	we saw earlier, according	to	Camp,	one	of	the	speech-acts	slur	users	engage	in	is	a	pure predication	of	membership in the	neutral counterpart	group	(Camp, 2013;	2018).	Thus,	in	all	these	cases,	it	would	not	be	possible	to	be	in the	extension	of	'faggot'	without	being	in	the	extension	of	'gay	man'.23 The	second	thing	to	notice	is	not	only	that	(2)	is	usually	not	perceived as	a	contradiction,	but	we	also	have	immediate,	clear	intuitions	about the	information	it	conveys.	Namely,	that	John	is	not	in	the	extension of men with a homosexual orientation, but	-	probably because he shares	salient	stereotypical	features	associated	with	gay	persons,	such as	talking	about	"female"	topics,	being	physically	"weak",	or	dressing stylishly	-	is	in	the	extension	of	'faggot'. 22.	Note	that	G-extending	uses	of	'faggot'	are	extremely	common.	As	sociologist C.	J.	Pascoe	notices	in	her	study	on	masculinity	and	sexuality	in	high	school, "[a]	boy	could	get	called	a	fag	for	exhibiting	any	sort	of	behavior	defined	as unmasculine (although	not	necessarily	behaviors	aligned	with femininity): being	stupid	or incompetent,	dancing,	caring too	much	about	clothing,	being	too	emotional,	or	expressing	interest	(sexual	or	platonic)	in	other	guys" (Pascoe,	2012,	p.	57). 23. The same	point applies to the	analyses in	Bach (2018);	Cepollaro	&	Stojanovic	(2016);	Hom	(2008);	Hom	and	May	(2013;	2015);	Hornsby	(2001);	Nunberg	(2018);	Potts	(2004);	Schlenker	(2007);	Sennet	and	Copp	(2015);	Whiting	(2013);	and	Williamson	(2009),	because	they	either	include	the	meaning of the neutral counterpart into the truth-conditional	meaning of a slur, or treat	slurs	and	neutral	counterparts	as	truth-conditionally	equivalent	(conditional	on	the	existence	on	a	neutral	counterpart	term-see	Nunberg,	2018). eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) b.	"I	know	you	haven't	lied,	but	deep	down,	you're	a liar." Intuitively,	taking	the	slur	usages	in	(4)	to	(6a)	to	be	non-literal	seems implausible.	This	point	is	strengthened	if	we	look	at	the	use	of	'liar'	in (6b). In	(6b),	which	parallels	(6a),	what	the	speaker is literally	accusing	me	of	and	is	thus	accountable	for	is	being,	deep	down,	a	liar.	To say that 'liar' is used in a non-literal sense therefore seems unjustified.	Similarly,	it	is	difficult	to	make	sense	of	the	claim	that	the	speaker in	(6a)	labels	someone	with	the	slur	in	any	non-literal	way	-	after	all, the	speaker	claims	that	this	is	what	the	targeted	person,	deep	down, is. The intended	meanings of (4)–(6) are furthermore directly available, even though the	objects	of discourse	don't belong to the	neutral	counterpart	groups	in	question	and	the	slurs	have	been	combined with	modifiers	that	don't	seem	to	call	for	metaphorical	readings,	such as	'true'	and	'real'.	These	data,	while	not	absolutely	decisive,	seriously undermine	the	claim	that	G-extending	are	non-literal	uses	of	slurs. (2) G-contracting Uses of Slurs In	so-called	"G-contracting"	uses	of	slurs,	the	domain	of	possible	targets	is	contracted:	It	is	made	explicit	that	the	range	of	a	slur	is	not	the entire	neutral	counterpart	group	that	is	predominantly	associated	with a	slur	(see	Jeshion,	2013a): (7)	"I	don't	have	anything	against	feminists	-	in	fact,	I'm	a feminist	myself.	What	I	hate	are	these	feminazis." (8)	"Although	my	best	friend	is	gay,	you	can	be	sure	that he's	not	a	faggot." (9)	"Thank	God!	My	new	neighbors	are	lesbians,	but	they are	not	dykes." As	with	G-extending	examples,	(7)–(9)	are	perfectly	meaningful,	fairly common	examples	of	slur	usage.29	As	before,	a	number	of	accounts 29.	For	a	selection	of	other	G-contracting	examples	as	evidence	against	co-referentialism	about	slurs,	see	Croom	(2015). other	cases	of	metaphorical	language-use	and	assume	that	these	cases and	G-extending uses of slurs are parallel. However,	whether these uses	are	parallel	is	precisely	what	is	at	stake	-	I	haven't	yet	seen	a	defense	of	this	claim	that	establishes,	and	not	simply	assumes,	that	they are.25	In	fact,	it	is	no	surprise	that	these	theories	advocate	the	non-literalness	solution;	otherwise,	G-extending	uses	would	falsify	their	theories.	And	although	it	is	not	my	claim	that	this	strategy	is	in	principle unavailable	to	debunk	the	data	in	(2)	and	(3),	it	is	important	to	note that the	essentialist theory	provides	us	with	a	plausible	explanation that	takes	the	data	at	face	value	and	captures	them	without	having	to rely	on	moves	that	treat	G-extending	uses	as	non-literal.26 Note	also	that	G-extending	uses	of	slurs	as	the	one	in	(2)	are	commonplace	in	the	everyday	language	of	slur	users.27	Their	meaning	is available immediately and effortlessly, so there is	prima facie strong motivation	for	taking	these	highly	conventional	uses	to	be	literal.28	Additional	evidence	comes	from	constructions	with	modifiers	and	qualifiers	such	as	'true',	'real',	and	'deep	down': (4)	"Although	Leyla	isn't	a	socialist,	she's	still	a	true/real commie." (5)	"Although	Jack	isn't	Italian,	he's	still	a	true/real	dago." (6) a. "I know that he's not gay, but deep down, he's a faggot." 25. The	cleanest test I	can think	of in	which two	quite	uncontroversially truthconditionally	equivalent	open	class	expressions	in	different	word	forms	are employed	in	a	way	similar	to	(2)	is	"Guillermo	is	not	a	bachelor,	but	he	is	an unmarried	man".	This	example,	however,	does	not	pattern	with	(2)	or	(3).	It	is incredibly	hard,	if	not	impossible,	to	make	sense	of	the	statement. 26.	Also	Cepollaro	(2017)	notices	that	it	is	never	argued	for,	but	always	assumed, that	G-extending	uses	and	other	metaphorical	language	uses	are	parallel. 27. See	fn.	22. 28.	One	might	think	that	this	data	would	also	be	compatible	with	an	analysis	of slurs	in	terms	of	conventional	implicature	(e.g.,	Copp,	2009;	Whiting,	2013; Williamson,	2009);	however,	note	that	the	conventional	implicature	analyses on	offer	will	still	predict	that	(2)	and	(3)	result	in	contradictions. eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) (10)	"Let's	watch	the	movie	with	those	cunts	in	it." (11)	"Of	course,	the	kraut	made	me	fail	the	exam." (12) "The University of Southern California is full of chinks." It	is	important	to	show	that	my	theory	does	not	only	account	for	the tricky linguistic	cases,	but	also	gets	the	basic	data	right.	We	want	to know	why	the	application	of	slurs to	those	groups is	"licensed",	and why	the	uses	in	question	are	derogatory.	According	to	my	theory,	in each	case,	the	targets	are	attributed,	on	the	basis	of	some	observable surface	features,	a	Chinese,	German,	or	female	"essence"	which	causally	determines	a	set	of	negative	features.	The	attribution	is	"licensed" because	members	of	the	neutral	counterpart	group,	in	the	eyes	of	the racist or homophobe, just are the paradigmatic instantiators of features	that	indicate	the	presence	of	the	relevant	essence.	In	most	cases, already instantiating surface features such as +looking female or +being	german	will	have	sufficient	inductive	power	as	to	license	the inference	to	the	relevant	essence	for	the	slur	user.	This	accounts	for the	meaning	profile	we	attribute	to	(10)–(12).	The	slurs	then	generally apply to the targets that	belong to the social group	we call 'neutral counterpart',	because,	in	the	in	the	eyes	of	the	slur	user,	the	mentioned surface	features	generally	license	application.	The	uses	are	derogatory: Making	members	of	the	social	group	in	question	subject	to	this	causaldeterministic	essentialization	conveys	to	them	that	they	don't	deserve the	full	respect	we	grant	persons	qua persons. (4) Non-derogatory, Non-appropriated Uses of Slurs Another	species	of	slur	that	is	often	considered	problematic	in	the	literature	are	non-derogatory	examples	of	slur	uses,	sometimes	termed "non-weapon" (Jeshion, 2013a) or "NDNA" uses (where "NDNA" stands	for	"non-derogatory,	non-appropriated";	see	Hom,	2008).	One example	of	an	NDNA	use	is	(from	Hom,	2008): predict	that	this	type	of	sentence	yields	a	semantic	contradiction,	since they	subscribe	to	the	view	that	slurs	and	their	neutral	counterpart	are truth-conditionally equivalent.30 Since slurs and their neutral counterparts	are	truth-conditionally	equivalent,	it	is	not	possible	to	apply the	neutral	counterpart	term	to	someone	while	denying	that	the	target belongs to the set	denoted	by the slurring	noun.31	According to the essentialist	theory,	the	meaning	of	slurs	and	their	counterparts	is	not equivalent.	Thus,	a	slur	user	can	deny	that	someone	has	an	"essence" that	causes	negative	properties	while	attributing	the	bare	property	of homosexual	preferences to	him.	This is the	case if the	object	of the discourse, in the	eyes	of the	slur	user,	does	not	exhibit	sufficient surface	features	that	would	license	the	inductive	inference	to	the	"gayness essence".	And this	fits the intuition for (8):	While the	person	under discussion	has	homosexual	preferences,	we	take	the	sentence	to	mean that	he	will	lack	many	features	associated	with	a	"gay	nature". (3) G-referencing Uses of Slurs In so-called "G-referencing"	uses	of slurs, the	slurred target	belongs to	the	social	group	that	is	predominantly	associated	with	the	slur	in question.	These	cases	are	commonly	considered	the	most	basic	cases of	slur	usage.	(10)–(12)	illustrate	these	G-referencing	uses: 30.	As in the last section, advocates of the hypothesis that slurs and their neutral counterparts are truth-conditionally equivalent can resort to the claim that the	slur	uses in (7)–(9)	are	non-literal.	Again, I	don't claim that there	are	no	strategies for these theories to	accommodate this	data	point- after	all,	pragmatic	moves	are	always	available	to	explain	any	phenomenon away.	However,	leaving	aside	the	reasons	I	gave	in	the	last	section	against	a pragmatic	and	in	favor	of	a	semantic	analysis,	I'd	like	to	re-emphasize	that	the essentialist	theory	accommodates	this	phenomenon	smoothly	without	relying on	additional	pragmatic	explanations	and	is	therefore	arguably	explanatorily more	powerful. 31. In	fact,	accounts	under	which	semantic	content	is	exhausted	by	truth-conditional	content	(e.g.,	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	Nunberg,	2018)	predict	that G-contracting	sentences	are	semantically	identical	to	their	G-extending	counterpart	sentences, since	⟦slur⟧ = ⟦counterpart⟧.	This	prediction	hasn't	been made	explicit	in	the	literature	to	my	knowledge,	but	strikes	me	as	worrisome. eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) (5) Null-extension We	have seen that an (empirical) consequence	of	my framework is that	most	slurs	-	importantly,	the	ones	we	regard	as	particularly	toxic	-	don't have any extension	in	the	actual	world.	In	these	cases,	scientific discovery	has	revealed	that	nothing	is	such	that	it	has	a	causal	"nature" of	a	social	group	that	explains	and	dispositionally	causes	the	possession	of	stereotypically	bad	features.	There	is,	of	course,	no	such	thing as	a "Latino	essence" that	dispositionally	causes	Latin	Americans to harass	women	or	work	in	the	service	industry.	There	is	no	such	thing as a "blackness essence" that	dispositionally causes	black	people to dislike	work	or	engage	in	criminal	activities.	And	so	on.	Slur	terms	are not	true	of	anything,	and	consequently,	sentences	predicating	slurs	of individuals	are	either	meaningless	or	false.	Thus,	analogously	to	terms like 'phlogiston', slurs are examples of kind terms that have simply been	unsuccessfully	introduced.	A	core	condition	for	successful	introduction	of	a	kind	term	is	that	it	is	correct that	supposed	similarities	of	a kind	have	a	"single	unifying	explanation"	(Soames,	2010,	p.	89),	which, for	slurs,	is	simply	not	the	case.	The	intuition	that	sentences	such	as (15)	"There	are	dykes." (16)	"Jews	are	kikes." (17)	"All	women	are	cunts." strike	us	as	obviously	false	is	therefore	easily	captured	by	the	essentialist	theory. One	question	that	arises	here	is	whether	essentialism	about	slurs really	secures	null-extension.	Oppressed,	socially-constructed	groups can	be	subject	to	unjust	practices	that,	given	the	world	as	it	is,	connect a	metalinguistic	use	could	pick	up	on	and	(b)	no	reading	in	which	a	comment on	a	linguistic	item	is	made	is	available	to	me,	since	(c)	'as'	clearly	introduces an	intensional	context,	it	is	unclear	to	me	how	a	metalinguistic	analysis	for this	case	should	work.	But	since	the	main	focus	in	this	part	of	the	paper	is to	motivate	the	essentialist	theory	by	showing	that	it	covers	a	wide	range	of data,	and	not	so	much	on	refuting	alternative	theories,	I	will	leave	this	issue aside	for	now. (13)	"Institutions	that	treat	Chinese	as	chinks	are	morally depraved." Accounts	that	treat	slurs	as	truth-conditionally	equivalent	to	their	neutral	counterpart	terms	predict	that	(13)	is	true	exactly	when	(14)	is: (14) "Institutions that treat	Chinese	as	Chinese	are	morally	depraved." But	intuitively,	many	speakers	would	assign	truth	to	(13)	while	rejecting (14). In	addition,	many	expressivist accounts	predict that (13) is derogatory, since each assertion of a proposition containing a slur is an expression of contempt. However, according to some theorists	-	prominently,	Chris	Hom	-	(13) is an instance	of a	non-derogatory	(even	if	upsetting,	triggering,	and	hence	offensive)	speech-act.32 By	now,	it	should	be	clear	how	my	account	explains	the	fact	that (13)	is	felicitous	and	at	least	different	in	derogatory	status	from	the	examples	we	encountered	earlier.	'Chinese'	and	'chink'	are	not	synonymous	according	to	my	account;	only	the	latter	term	is	true	of	those	individuals	that	share	a	"Chinese	essence"	which	causes	them	to	exhibit negative stereotypical features. The speaker of (13) thus expresses that	institutions	that	treat	the	group	of	Chinese	people	in	this	causally deterministic	manner	are	morally	depraved	-	which	is	evidently	true and	thus	accords	with	our	truth-intuitions.33 32. Like others, I have the intuition that even uses in intensional contexts like	(13)	will	be	upsetting	or	offensive,	e.g.,	as	a	result	of triggering	effects. However,	we	might	still	want	to	agree	with	Hom	that	there	is	some	principled difference	in	degree	of	derogation (as	opposed	to	offensiveness)	between	nonNDNA	uses	and	NDNA	uses,	and	expect	a	theory	to	capture	this	difference. Alternatively, the	slur	might trigger	an	existential	presupposition	such that derogation	projects	out	even in this intensional	context, in	which	case the phenomenon	would	fall	under	my	later	discussion	of	derogatory	projection. 33. A	reviewer	pointed	out	to	me	that	NDNA	uses	of	this	kind	could	be	analyzed metalinguistically.	Although	I	understand-in	fact,	as	will	become	clear	in	the next	sections,	advocate-this	point	when	applied	to	some	cases	of	negation (as	has	been	done,	for	example,	in	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	Bolinger,	2017; Jeshion,	2013a;	and	particularly	rigorously	in	Cepollaro,	2017),	it	is	hard	for me	to	see	how	a	metalinguistic	move	can	be	applied	to	(13).	Especially	in	light of	the	fact	that	(a)	no	slur	is	mentioned	before	the	occurrence	of	the	slur	that eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) sufficiently	many	features	of	the	feature	list	associated	with	a	slur	S,	S is	true of	P.	However,	it	is	not	implausible	that	there	will	be	individuals that	happen	to	exhibit	the	features	associated	with	the	slur	-	as	a	matter	of	structural	injustices,	or	simply	because	of	their	very	individual life	choices.	Thus,	the	extension	of	slurs	will	not	be	the	empty	set	under	Croom's	account.	Specifically,	a	sentence	such	as (18)	"Alberto	is	a	spic." would	have	to	be	treated	as	strictly	true	if	Alberto	happens	to	satisfy a number of features associated with the slur, which, according to Croom,	include	features	such	as	"x	is	a	Mexican-American"	or	"x	is	a foreign	worker	or exchange student	with a thick	non-native accent" (Croom,	2014b,	p.	162).	The	essentialist	account	differs	from	Croom's insofar	as	what is	decisive for the	successful reference	of the	slur is whether the target	possesses some intrinsic "Latino	essence",	which slur	users	take	to	unify	all 'spics',	that	disposes	them	to	exhibit	negative	traits.	Thus,	(18)	will	be	false	even	if	Alberto	happens	to	exhibit	a number	of features	corresponding	with	the	stereotype.	Again,	while these	accounts	might	be	able	to	appeal	to	explanations	that	lie	outside the	domain	of	their	theories	to	explain	our	falsehood	and	referential intuitions	about	slurs	away,34	the	essentialist	theory	accounts	for	them directly. The	null-extension	consequence	of	my	view	also	gives	us the resources	to	deal	with	a	species	of	NDNA	uses	of	slurs	that	can	be	classified	as	"metalinguistic	denial": (19)	"There	are	no	chinks	at	my	university,	there	are	only Chinese	people." Take	this	sentence	to	be	uttered	by	a	non-racist	who,	upon	hearing	(12), intends	to	express	that	the	slur	does	not	apply	to	Chinese	people	at the	university,	while	'Chinese'	does.	The	question	is	how	a	non-racist person	could	a)	negate	the	slur	predicate	while	applying	the	'Chinese' 34. For such a strategy, see, e.g., Anderson and Lepore (2013); Camp (2018); Jeshion	(2013b);	or	Whiting	(2013). group	membership	in	non-accidental	ways	to	negative	properties	that emerge	from	the	oppression.	Since	the	oppressive	forces	converge	on individuals	because	they	are	taken	to	be	members	of the	group,	the connection is causal. Since	membership in the socially constructed kind	is	in	part	a	question	of	whether	one	is	taken	to	be	or	treated	as	a member	of	that	kind,	the	causal	connection	is	through	group	membership.	If	that	is	the	case,	the	conditions	specified	by	a	slur	might	sometimes	be	satisfied	and	the	slur	can	successfully	refer.	This	is	an	important objection to the	null-extension	hypothesis. In response, I	want to	highlight	certain	assumptions	that	constrain	our	representations	of "essences":	We	see	them	as	internal and	intrinsic to	the	subject;	a	class of	subjects	cannot	possess	an	essence	relationally.	As	Haslanger	(2011) puts	it	for	the	case	of	generics: [Generics	license	the	inference	that]	the	fact	in	question obtains by virtue of something specifically about the subject so described, i.e.,	about	women,	or	blacks,	or	sagging pants.	In	the	examples	I've	offered,	however,	this	implication	is	unwarranted.	The	facts in	question	obtain	by	virtue	of	broad	system	of	social	relations	within	which	the subjects	are	situated,	and	are	not	grounded	in	intrinsic or dispositional features of the subjects themselves.	(my	emphasis,	Haslanger,	2011,	p.	446) Similarly,	the	causal	element	of	slurs	presupposes	that	the	essence	is intrinsic,	not	extrinsic,	to	the	subject.	Since	this	condition	is	not	satisfied	in	the	cases	I'm	discussing,	slurs	don't	have	extension. In	contrast	to	my	account,	many	other	accounts,	such	as	Anderson and	Lepore's	minimalist	and	Jeshion's	expressivist	accounts,	are	committed	to	the	view	that	the	sentences	in	(15)–(17)	are	true.	But	also	accounts	that	lie	closer	to	the	account	I	propose	here	differ	in	the	predictions	they	make	about	slurs'	reference	and,	correspondingly,	the	truth of	sentences	containing	slurs.	Consider	Croom's	family	resemblance view	of	slurs	(Croom,	2011;	2015).	According	to	him,	slurs	encode	a set of negatively-valenced	weighted features. If a person P satisfies eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) (21)	All	mermaids	live	in	Ohio. (22)	Every	unicorn	admires	Noam	Chomsky. (23)	All	phlogiston	is	located	in	the	Pacific	Ocean. If	you	agree	with	the	position	that	quantifiers	come	with	lexical	existential	presuppositions,	then	(20)	will	come	out	as	false	or	truth-valueless.	If	you	don't	agree	with	it,	(20)	will	come	out	as	trivially	true,	but so	will	(21)–(23)	-	which	doesn't	lead	anyone	to	worry	about	whether 'mermaid',	'unicorn',	or	'phlogiston'	in	fact	have	an	extension.	In	short, the	objection	doesn't	pose	any	problem	for	null-extensionality	views of	slurs. (6) Derogatory Projection Importantly, although slurs have null-extension, uses of slurs still carry	an	existential presupposition.	Slur	users	presuppose	that	there are individuals	that	fall	under	the	extension	of	the	slurs	they	use.37	This accounts	for	a	peculiar,	well-known	fact	about	slurs'	projection	behavior:	Their	derogatory	effect	persists	in	various	compositional	contexts, such as negations, conditionals,	modals, or questions (Anderson	& Lepore, 2013; Bolinger, 2017; Camp, 2013; 2018; Cepollaro	& Stojanovic,	2016;	Hom,	2010;	Jeshion,	2013b). (24)	"He's	not	a	kike,	he's	a	Muslim." (25)	"How	many	chinks	are	at	the	University	of	Southern California?" (26)	"If	he's	a	wop,	I	won't	date	him." (27) "She's so bad with the wand, she might be a mudblood." 37. The	existential	presupposition	is	(arguably)	not	triggered	in	instances	of	metalinguistic	denial,	as	in	(19)	or	in	cases	of	negative	existentials	in	contexts	of the	type:	"He	isn't	a	chink;	no	one	is." predicate, and,	again,	b)	do so	without	derogation.35	My framework predicts	that	(19)	has	these	properties.	The	non-racist	and	properly	informed	person	rejects	the	causal	connection	between	a	"Chineseness essence"	and	the	negative	stereotypical	properties	encoded	in	the	slur. She	rightly	thinks	that	nothing is	in	the	extension	of	'chink':	It	is	true	of nobody	that	they	have	a	"Chineseness"	nature	that	causally	disposes them	to	manifest	negative	stereotypical	features	associated	with	being Chinese.	By	asserting	the	first	conjunct	of	(19),	she	just	rejects	what she	correctly	believes	to	be	false.	Since	the	speaker	of	(19)	expresses that	Chinese	people	don't	fall	under	the	extension	of	the	slur	(since no	one	does),	we	can	also	classify	(19)	as	an	instance	of	metalinguistic denial. Before	moving	on,	I	will	address	an	objection	that	Sennet	and	Copp (2015)	raise	against	the	null-extensionality	thesis	as	defended	in	Hom and	May	(2015).	If	successful,	it	would	also	apply	to	my	version	of	the thesis.	Fortunately, it isn't.	Their	charge	is	that	null-extensionality	of slurs	entails	that	sentences	of	the	following	kind	are	trivially	true: (20)	"All	kikes	are	Mormons." But,	contra	null-extensionality,	Sennet	and	Copp	remark	that	(20)	is intuitively	false. A standard position in formal semantics is that	we should introduce	an	existential	domain	condition	(in	other	words,	a	lexical existential presupposition) to	our semantics for	universal	quantifiers,36 since this	would	increase	the	descriptive	accuracy	of	our	theory	of	quantifiers	with	respect	to	sentences	like	(21)–(23),	which	would	all	come	out as	trivially	true	without	such	a	condition. 35. See	fn.	32. 36.	See,	e.g.,	Diesing	(1992),	McCawley	(1972),	Strawson	(1963).	See	Heim	and Kratzer	(1998,	ch.	6)	for	an	introductory	overview	of	the	debate.	The	lexical entry	of	'all'	would	change	to Note	that	there	is no	controversy	about	whether	sentences	like	(21)–(23)	introduce	some existential	presupposition.	The	question	is	whether	it	is	to	be	located	lexically	or pragmatically. eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) nothing	is	in	the	extension	of	slurs,	the	informed	speaker	is	licensed	to respond	with	a	denial	of	the	presupposed	content.39 (7) Derogatory Variation Let us now turn to the last explanandum on our list. It is widely thought	that	some	pejoratives	are	more	powerful	in	their	disparaging and	derogating force than	others, a	phenomenon that is standardly listed	as	a	central	explanatory	desideratum	for theories	of	slurs	(Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	Bolinger,	2017;	Hom,	2008;	2010).	Compare, for	example,	the	difference	in	offensiveness	between	the	N-word	and 'limey'	-	the	former is	substantially	stronger in its	derogatory	effects than	the	latter.	The	same	goes	for 'chink'	vs. 'kraut', 'kike'	vs. 'honky', 'wog'	vs.	'yank',	and	so	on.40	Furthermore,	the	derogatory	content	of	a slur	can	vary	as	a	function	of	time:	The	derogatory	force	of	'kraut'	or 'commie', for instance,	was substantially stronger	during the time	of World	War	II	and	the	Cold	War,	respectively,	than	it	is	now. Many	theories	contend	that	the	difference	in	encoded	negative	attitudes	or	negative	descriptive	information	is	what	accounts	for	the	fact that	slurs	differ	in	their	derogatory	strength.41 Prima facie,	this	explanation	seems	very	plausible.	For	example,	we	often	find	that	powerful slurs	are	also	associated	with	very	negative	stereotypes.	Most	would agree	that	the	social	stereotypes	associated	with	white	people	('honky')	are	less	negatively	valenced	than	the	stereotypes	associated	with people	of	Chinese	ethnicity	('chink'),	which	in	turn	are	less	negative than	the	ones	associated	with	black	persons	(N-word).42	And	knowing 39.	Correspondingly,	our	earlier	example	(19)	would	be	an	appropriate	answer to	the	question	asked	in	(25),	as	it	expresses	refusal	to	accept	the	existential presupposition	that	the	speaker	introduces	by	its	utterance. 40.	See	Mullen	and	Leader	(2005)	and	Rice	et	al.	(2010)	for	an	empirical	quantification	of	these	differences. 41. That	holds	true	especially	of	views	that	are	close	to	the	view	I	advocate	here (e.g.,	Croom,	2011;	Hom,	2008),	but	is	also	a	move	open	to	expressivist	views. 42. For	an	empirical	quantification	of the	negative	stereotypes	associated	with some of the social groups referenced in this paper, see, e.g., Bessenoff	& Sherman	(2000);	Copping	et	al.	(2013);	Cvencek,	Meltzoff,	and	Greenwald Take,	as	an	example,	(24).	Although	the	speaker	does	not attribute	a "Jewish essence" to the object of discourse, (24) clearly stays an instance	of	derogatory	slur	usage.	Why? Usually, when we introduce entities into a discourse by talking about	them,	we	signal	to	our	interlocutors	that	we	take	their	existence for	granted: (28)	Do	you	prefer	cats	or	dogs? (29)	This	isn't	silver,	it's	stainless	steel. (30)	If	that's	lemonade,	I	want	it. (31)	The	woman	we	met	yesterday	was	so	eloquent,	she might	be	an	English	professor. Uttering	(28)–(31)	presupposes	that	you	believe	that	there	are	cats,	silver, lemonade, or English professors.	Analogously, utterance of any sentence	in	(24)–(27)	is	only	felicitous	if	the	speaker	presupposes	that there	are	objects	in	our	domain	the	slurs	apply	to.	But	presupposing, like the speaker	does in (24), that there is something like	a "Jewish essence",	carried	predominantly	by	Jewish	people	that	causally	predisposes	them	to	exhibit	negative	features,	of	course	dehumanizes	and derogates	the	entire	group	of	Jews.38	This	explains	why	the	derogatoriness	of	slurs	persists	even	if	the	speaker	does	not	assertively	predicate a	causally	potent	essence to	a	discourse	object.	And	since in reality, 38.	Note	that	we	can	successfully	apply	the	well-known	"wait	a	minute"	test	to (24)–(27), revealing the existential presuppositions triggered by the examples.	This	test	is	standardly	employed	to	test	the	presuppositions	triggered	by a	sentence	(von	Fintel,	2009).	Consider, (32)	Stephen	stopped	smoking. The	"wait	a	minute"	test	reveals	that	(32)	presupposes	that	Stephen	smoked. If	I	am	not	willing	to	accommodate	the	common	ground	appropriately-because	I think	that	Stephen	never	smoked-I	can	felicitously	respond:	"Wait a	minute-Stephen	never	smoked!"	Similarly, "Wait	a	minute-there	are	no kikes!"	conveys	the	refusal	to	accommodate	the	common	ground	as	required by	the	existential	presupposition. eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) their	race,	sexuality,	gender,	or	ethnicity	-	are	the	ones	which,	in	addition	to	encoding	profoundly	negative	stereotypes,	are	highly essentialized.	In	each	case,	the	slur	expresses	that	it	is	in	someone's	very nature to	have	features	that	are	bad.	And	while	knowing	that	you	think	badly of	me	hurts,	knowing	that	you	think	badly	of	me	because	of	something in	my	intrinsic,	inescapable	nature	is	deep.	What	I	do	and	who	I	am	is not	seen	as	a	matter	of	my	individual	choices	and	agency,	but	as	a	deep matter	of	my	nature.	This	is	what	it	means	to	dehumanize. Let	us	go	in	more	detail	through	my	semantic	model	and	the	way it	explains the	data. I	maintain that the	derogatory force	of	a	slur is a	direct	offspring	of its semantics,	where the	essence	and the set	of negative	features	are	the	determining	factors	of	a	slur's	meaning.	The derogatory	strength	of	a	slur	therefore	is	a	function	of	these	elements. The	more	negative	the	represented	stereotype	of	a	group	is,	the	more demeaning	the	corresponding	slur	should	come	out.45	The	more	a	category	is	essentialized,	the	stronger	the	diminishing	effects	of	the	slur should	be.	When	the	two	of	them	come	together,	the	derogatory	force of	slurs	is	explosive.46	Thus,	holding	the	level	of	essentialism	(largely) fixed,	slurs	for	groups	with	stronger	negative	stereotypes	are	more	derogatory.	Holding	the	degree	of	negative	stereotyping	fixed,	slurs	for groups	which	are	more	essentialized	will	be	more	derogatory.47	When 45. Of	course,	the	represented	stereotype	must	also	conventionally govern	the	slur in	question.	However,	we	can	say	that	our	representation	of	the	stereotype of	the	social	group	most	associated	with	the	slur	is	a	rough	measure	of	the stereotype	convention	that	governs	the	slur. 46. Interestingly,	high	level	of	essentialism	towards	a	social	group	has	often	been found	to	predict	negative	stereotyping	and	prejudice	(see	Bastian	&	Haslam, 2006; Haslam	& Ernst, 2002; Haslam	& Levy, 2006; Howell,	Weikum,	& Dyck,	2011;	Levy	&	Dweck,	1999;	Pauker	et	al.,	2010;	Prentice	& Miller,	2007; Williams	&	Eberhardt,	2008).	See	also	Leslie	(2017)	for	a	discussion	of	our tendency	to	attribute	features	to	an	essence	of	a	basic-level	category	when these	features	are	negative. 47. These comparisons are not completely clean-it proves hard to keep the essentialist or stereotype dimensions fixed when making comparisons. It is very	plausible, for example, that the social category	of communists	was more	essentialized	during	the	Cold	War	than	it is	now.	Similarly,	although "race" receives generally the highest essentialism ratings, essentialism for that others think ill of or	harbor	negative attitudes against us	hurts. This	is	true	even	when	the	agents	that	harbor	these	attitudes	are	not significant	to	us.	Imagine	you	notice	how	a	bunch	of	teenagers	in	the subway	are	snickering,	making	it	obvious	that	you	are	the	source	of their amusement. These teenagers are complete strangers, and you will never see them	again.	You know that	whether these teenagers think	well	of	you	or	not	has	no	impact	whatsoever	on	anything	you take	to	matter in	your life.	Still, their	snicker	hurts.43	Naturally, then, stronger	negative	attitudes	will	hurt	more,	and	weaker	negative	attitudes	will	hurt	less. However, this	explanation	can't	be the	entire	story. It	misses	out on	a	general,	systematic	pattern	of	how	the	derogatory	force	of	different	slurs	varies.	Why	is	it	that	in	general,	slurs	that	target	someone	on the	basis	of	their	race,	ethnicity,	gender,	or	sexuality	are	particularly toxic?44	It	is	hard	to	imagine	a	slur	targeting	fans	of,	say,	an	opposing football	team	to	possibly	be	more	derogatory	than	slurs	such	as	'faggot' or	'kike'	-	even	if	the	properties	associated	with	these	fans	were	highly negative.	By	the	same	token,	these	slurs	seem	to	be	more	diminishing than	'lardass',	'libtard',	or	'junkie',	although	the	corresponding	groups are, from the perspective of the users, associated	with highly negative	stereotypes.	Theories that solely rely	on	differences in	negative attitudes	or	descriptive	information	can't	account	for	this	fine-grained pattern	of	the	data. The	essentialist theory	captures this subtle	pattern.	The	slurs	we find	particularly toxic	-	the	ones targeting someone	on the	basis	of (2011);	Cvencek	et	al.	(2015);	Devine	(1989);	Dovidio,	Evans,	and	Tyler	(1986); Eberhardt	et	al.	(2004);	Gaertner	and	McLaughlin	(1983);	Goff	et	al.	(2008); Wang, Brownell, and Wadden (2004); Woods, Kurtz-Costes, and Rowley (2005). 43. The	example	is	based	on	an	example	used	in	Bero	(2017). 44. In	a	similar	vein,	Popa-Wyatt	asks	in	her	2016	paper:	"Is	it	coincidence	that many	of	the	most	offensive	slur	words	are	associated	with	groups	we	might identify	as	oppressed?"	(Popa-Wyatt,	2016,	p.	155).	My	answer	to	that	question is	"no":	group	essentialism	is	the	key	variable	explaining	both	group	oppression	and	the	derogatory	potential	encoded	in	slurs	(see	Appiah,	2018;	Leslie, 2017;	Livingstone	Smith,	2011). eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) bring	to	our	minds	the	slurs	that	are	the	derogatorily	deepest,	we	will directly	see	that	they	fall	under	one	of	those	social	categories. Note	also	that	the	essentialist	theory	gives	us	a	natural	way	to	accommodate the theoretical difficulty of finding a clear demarcating criterion distinguishing slurs from non-slurs. Many theorists draw a	distinction	between	slurs,	which target individuals	based	on their membership in a	group, and individual	pejoratives,	which target individuals	based	on	some	(temporary)	behavior	or	"personal	qualities". While	everyone	can	point	at	paradigmatic	examples	of	slurs,	and	paradigmatic cases	of individual	pejoratives ('jerk', 'asshole', 'dickhead'), and	most feel the intuitive	pull to theoretically	distinguish	between these	two	classes	(although	see	Jeshion,	2013a	for	a	criticism	of	this distinction),	there	are	many	pejorative	terms	that	have	proven	to	be quite	difficult	to	classify	in	one	way	or	the	other.	Consider, (33)	"Hey	fatso!" Popa-Wyatt (2016)	notices that (33)	-	like 'lardass', 'druggie', 'junkie', 'bum',	or	'commie'	- sits	in	the	middle	ground	between	[slurs]	and	[individual pejoratives]	[...].	Like	pejoratives	targeted	at	individuals, they	identify	the	targeted	individual	on	the	basis	of	specific	properties	that	s/he	has.	But	like	slurs,	they	express contempt not only about the particular individual but also	about	other	people	who	have	similar features,	and so	may	be	identified	as	part	of	a	group.	(p.	152) Essentialism	about	slurs	explains	why	it	is	difficult	to	find	a	clear	line distinguishing	slurs from individual	pejoratives. Just	as	essentialism ratings	are	on	a	continuum,	our	judgements	about	whether	something is	a	slur	or	not	will	be	on	a	continuum,	rather	than	an	all-or-nothing affair. People are less sure about	whether people	with higher body weight	or	communist	attitudes	are	describable	by	having	some	"group prejudice and negative stereotyping towards groups such as homosexuals (Haslam	&	Levy,	2006). a	category	is	both strongly	essentialized	and	the	associated	stereotypes are	highly	negative,	the	diminishing	force	of	a	slur	culminates. While	it	is	evident	that	the	negative	stereotypes	we	associate	with a group can be	more or less pronounced, it has also long been established	that	there	are	differences	in	the	degrees	to	which	we	essentialize	social	groups.	In	an	important	study,	Nick	Haslam	and	his	colleagues	(2000)	developed	a	set	of	questions	that	assessed	different	dimensions	along	which	we	essentialize	groups.	Specifically,	they	tested whether	participants	essentialized	social	groups	along	the	dimensions of naturalness, stability, discreteness of category boundaries, immutability	of	category	membership,	and	necessity	of	category	features.48 Within	the	40	social	categories	that	were	rated,49	the	categories	of	gender, ethnicity, and race	as	well	as	Jews and	homosexuals received	particularly	high	ratings,	and	the	categories	associated	with	interests,	politics, appearance,	and	social	class	received	the	lowest	ratings.50	And	if	we the	category	"black" is	still	more	marked	than	essentialism	for	"white"	(see Haslam	et	al.,	2000). 48. They took these to	be the	dimensions "that	are	commonly invoked in	psychological,	philosophical	and	social	scientific	writings"	(Haslam	et	al.,	2000, p.	117).	In	the	study,	they	asked	participants	to	rate,	on	a	scale	from	1	to	9,	to which	extent	one	of	the	listed	dimensions	applies	to	a	category.	The	dimension	of	discreteness,	for	example,	was	described	to	the	participants	as	follows: "[s]ome	categories	have	sharper	boundaries	than	others.	For	some,	membership	is	clear-cut,	definite,	and	of	an	'either/or'	variety;	people	either	belong	to the	category	or	they	do	not.	For	others,	membership	is	more	'fuzzy';	people belong	to	the	category	in	varying	degrees."	To	give	another	example,	the	dimension	of	naturalness	was	described	to	the	participants	as	"some	categories are	more	natural	than	others,	whereas	others	are	more	artificial". 49. The	aim	of the study	was to cover	as	many	categories	as	possible; among many	others,	some	of	the	assessed	categories	were,	e.g.,	diseases	(AIDS	patients,	cancer	patients),	dietary	groups	(meat	eaters,	vegetarians),	intelligence groups (smart	people,	people	of average intelligence), races (black,	white), religions	(Catholics,	Jews),	political	groups	(liberals,	Republicans). 50.	It	is	important	to	clarify	that	the	categories	Jews and	homosexuals	received	extremely	high	ratings	for	dimensions	that	Haslam	et	al.	describe	as	indexing a	group's	entitativity.	Entitativity	is	a	subtype	of	our	general	essentialist	bias, and	can	be	described	as	the	belief	that	members	of	a	group	are	very	similar	to one	another,	such	that	membership	in	a	group	is	very	informative	about	the nature	of	its	members.	Essentialism,	as	entitativity,	has	been	found	to	predict eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 19 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) structured	in	an	essentialist	way,	and	(2)	slurs	are	uniquely	associated with	negative	stereotypes. Let	us	start	with	component	(1).	Through	a	number	of	well-established psychological paradigms, cognitive psychologists have documented that certain categories	-	especially natural kind categories such	as	animals,	minerals,	and	chemicals	-	are	cognitively	represented in	a	highly	essentialized	way.	We	act	as	if	members	of	certain	categories	have	immutable,	enduring,	and	natural	essences	which	make	them what	they	are	(for	an	overview,	see	Gelman,	2003;	2004).	Furthermore, as	we	have already seen in the last section,	we	now	know that	we also	think	of	many	human	or	social categories in	this	exact	same,	highly essentialized,	way.51	More concretely,	we	behave as if social groups are real kinds: They have sharp category boundaries, are somewhat "natural",	historically	stable,	"real"	and	not	constructed,	and	allow	for rich	inductive	inferences	about	physical	and	behavioral	traits	of	their members.52	In	particular,	social	categories	such	as	race	and	ethnicity (Allport,	1954;	Gil‐White,	2001;	Haslam	et	al.,	2000;	Hirschfeld,	1996; Ho,	Roberts,	&	Gelman,	2015;	Pauker	et	al., 2016;	Verkuyten,	2003), gender	(Gelman,	2003;	Gelman,	Collman,	&	Maccoby,	1986;	Prentice 51. There is	wide-ranging	evidence	that	we	hold	essentialist	beliefs from	early childhood	on,	which	has	been	documented	by	psychologists-prominently, Susan A. Gelman-throughout the past 30 years. For example, preschool children	believe that	a	baby	kangaroo	raised	among	goats	will	grow	up to hop	and	have	a	pouch	(Gelman	&	Wellman,	1991;	cf.	Gelman,	2003).	They also	expect that	something	that	has	turtle insides	will	still	be	a	turtle	even if it	doesn't look like	one	(Gelman	&	Wellman,	1991),	suggesting	that they don't	rely	on	observable	surface	features	to	determine	kind	membership.	For our	tendency	to	essentialize	social	categories,	see,	e.g.,	Gelman	(2003);	Gil‐ White	(2001);	Haslam	(2000)	Haslam	&	Levy	(2006);	Haslam	et	al.	(2000); Hirschfeld (1995; 1996); Prentice	&	Miller, (2007). For a general overview of the	evidence	tracking	children's	essentialist	belief	structure,	see	Gelman (2003). 52. See,	e.g.,	Demoulin,	Leyens,	&	Yzerbyt	(2006);	Gelman	(2003);	Haslam	et al.	(2000).	It	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	these	markers	are	characteristic features of	our representation	of essences, and	do	not constitute	necessary conditions	for	something	to	be	represented	as	an	essence.	This	conception of	essences	also	doesn't	completely	correspond	to	the	philosopher's	as	"that intrinsic	aspect	of	a	thing	that	grounds	all	and	only	the	intrinsic	metaphysical necessities	that	hold	of	the	thing"	(Leslie,	2017,	p.	406). essence" that	determines their	behavior, traits, and	unifies them,	or whether they should	be	characterized simply	as	having	mutable, individual	properties.	Hence, in these	cases,	subjects	will	be	reluctant, unsure,	or in	disagreement	about	whether to	call	a term 'slur'	or	an 'individual	pejorative',	just	as	predicted	by	the	essentialist	theory. In sum, theories that appeal to differences between descriptive or expressive attitudes towards different social groups only can account	for	derogatory	variation	if	we	carve	up	the	data	in	a	very	coarsegrained,	one-dimensional	way.	To	account for the	subtle	pattern	we find	in	the	data,	we	need	another	parameter.	The	essentialist	theory delivers	this	level	by	adding	another	dimension	to	the	derogatory	potential	of	a	slur:	The	derogatory	force	of	a	slur	is	a	function	not	only of	the	negative	stereotypes	it	encodes,	but	its	stereotypes	and the	degree	to	which	it	essentializes.	The	essentialist	theory,	then,	uniquely captures	the	systematic	pattern	we	find	in	the	data	and	explains	why slurs	that	are	particularly	deep	in	their	offensiveness	tend	to	fall	under specific	categories;	categories	that	are	strongly	essentialized. §3 Slurs and the Psychology of Social Kinds 3.1 Experimental Evidence for the Essentialist Theory Thus	far,	I	have	motivated	my	theory	by	showing	that	an	essentialist semantics	for	slurs	can	account	for	their	main	linguistic	properties.	I now	present	converging	evidence	from	cognitive	psychology	for	the existence	of	the	cognitive	structures	postulated	by	my	theory	of	slurs. As	I	indicated	earlier,	I	here	assume	an	intimate	link	between	linguistic	meaning	and	mental	concepts.	More	specifically,	according	to	the background	view	I	take	for	granted	in	this	paper,	terms	inherit	their linguistic	meaning directly from internally individuated lexical concepts,	which	I	understand	as	the	smallest	constituents	of	thought	and primary	bearers	of	meaning.	From	this	perspective,	studying	the	structure	and	information	encoded	in	lexical	concepts	can	directly	inform our	semantic	theory.	We	will	review	evidence	in	favor	of	the	two	central	components	of	my	essentialist	analysis:	(1)	Slurs	are	semantically eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 20 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) psychologists for the	past	30	years. If	we	take	these	findings	at face value,	we	must, in any case, accept that	many social concepts	have an	essentialist	structure.	Accordingly, to	assume	that	also	slur	terms are	associated	with	essentialistically structured concepts is	not	only descriptively	plausible	but	also	theoretically	parsimonious. Let us now turn to the second key component of	my semantics, namely, that slurs	encode	negatively	valenced stereotypes.	Recently, the phenomenon of slurring language has begun to be empirically investigated	by	psycholinguists.	These	studies	revealed	that	slurs,	in contrast to their neutral counterpart terms, are uniquely associated with	negative	features.	Since	these	studies	used	implicit	paradigms	in some	of	their	studies,	we	have	good	reasons	to	think	that	these	negative	features	belong	to	the	semantic representation	of	slurs.55 In	an	experiment	using	a	free	association	paradigm,	Carnaghi	and Maass	(2008)	delivered	primary	evidence	for	the	negative	stereotypes encoded	in	slurs.	They	presented	participants	with	derogatory	words ('fag')	or	their	neutral	counterparts	('gay').	When	presented	with	the slurs,	the	first	three	words	participants	mentioned	were	significantly more negatively-valenced than when presented with their neutral counterparts.	However, since this experiment used an explicit paradigm,	we	cannot	make	strong	inferences	about	the	semantic	structure of	slurs	on	the	basis	of	it.56	For	this	reason,	in	a	follow	up	study,	Carnaghi 55. There are	many	ways to carve	up the semantics-pragmatics distinction. In this paper, I assume the psychology-based framework according to	which semantics includes those	representations that	enter into	and	are the	result of immediate composition by our linguistic competence, and pragmatics includes all post-compositional representations that have been subject to general	reasoning	processing	from	central	cognition. 56.	The	most important limitation	of explicit tasks is that they	do	not impose any	constraints	controlling	for	response	modifications	by	conscious	reasoning and voluntary control. For example, the negative association could as well	be	a	post-semantic,	pragmatic-inferential	phenomenon	and	would	thus not constitute evidence in favor of the hypothesis that stereotypes are semantically	encoded in slurs.	To reveal the "bare" linguistic representations behind	slurring	words,	it	is	more	appropriate	to	employ	a	paradigm	whose task	outcomes	are	not	influenced	or	distorted	by	other	non-semantic	cognitive	operations.	Implicit	tasks	are	ideal	to	unveil	the	semantic	representations behind	slurring	words,	since	their	task	outcomes	are	less	prone	to	be	a	result &	Miller,	2006;	2007),	caste	(Mahalingam,	2003),	sexual	orientation (Haslam	&	Levy,	2006),	religion	(Chalik,	Leslie,	&	Rhodes,	2017;	Toosi &	Ambady,	2011),	and	mental	illness	(Haslam,	2000;	Haslam	&	Ernst, 2002;	Howell,	Weikum,	&	Dyck,	2011)	-	in	short,	the	categories	that are	central	to	human	slurring	practices	-	have	been	found	to	be	cognitively	represented	in	a	highly	essentialized	way.53 For	illustration,	consider	the	case	of	race:	This	category	is	certainly among	the	most	relevant	for	slurs,	given	both	the	prevalence	and	deep offensiveness	of	epithets	that	target	subjects	on	the	basis	of	their	race. In	a	series	of	pivotal	experiments,	psychologist	Lawrence	Hirschfeld documented	essentialist thinking	about race in	both	adults	and	preschoolers as young as three years (Hirschfeld, 1995; 1996; see also Pauker	et	al.,	2010).	In	one	paradigm,	he	asked	preschoolers	whether a racial	property	class	-	hair	and	skin	color	-	or	a	physical	property class	-	clothing	style	and	color	-	would	remain	unchanged	as	a	person	grows	up.	Even	3-year-olds	judged	that	the	properties	connected with	race	were	more	constant	than	sartorial	properties.54	He	obtained the same preference for race as the dominant factor compared to other physical features for inheritance judgements:	When children were asked	which properties they	would inherit from their parents, they predominantly picked racial properties. In a switched-at-birth paradigm,	children	were	asked	which	racial	properties	a	child	that	was adopted	by	parents	of	another	skin	color	would	develop.	5-year-olds outweighingly	decided	in	favor	of	the	birth	parents'	racial	properties (Hirschfeld,	1996). To sum up, reasoning about social categories follows typical essentialist	dimensions	already	in	early	childhood.	Thus,	my	proposed structure of slurs neatly corresponds to the essentialist structure of social	categories	that	has	been	systematically	uncovered	by	cognitive 53. See	also	Prentice	and	Miller	(2007)	for	an	overview. 54. This	effect	can't	be	accounted	for	by	the	explanation	that	children	represent body	features	as	more	stable	than	non-body	features.	When	4-years	olds	were asked	to	choose	whether	body	build	vs.	hair	and	skin	color	would	remain	the same	over	life	span,	they	too	judged	significantly	more	often	in	favor	of	racial properties. eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 21 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) which	confirms,	experimentally,	that	there	is	a	major	semantic	difference between neutral category labels and their corresponding epithets.	In	similar	vein,	the	authors	of	the	studies	conclude	that [t]ogether,	these	results	suggest	that	derogatory	group	labels	differ	from	category	group	labels	mainly	with	respect to the	valence	of the	associations they	elicit.	Thus, it is not	so	much	the	ability	to	activate	stereotypical	content than	the	tendency	to	activate	less-flattering	associations that	distinguishes	derogatory	from	category	group	labels. (Carnaghi	& Maass,	2007,	p. 147) We saw in the last section that	my	view	explains the central linguistic data involving slurs, and I have now shown that it receives additional, converging evidence from cognitive psychology. Specifically,	we	have	seen	that	social	concepts	associated	with	social	terms are	organized	essentialistically,	and	that	slurs	are	uniquely	associated with	negatively	valenced	stereotypes.	As	a	result,	my	semantic	theory converges	with	an	independently	plausible	research	program	on	the view that social concepts have essentialist structure, and is directly supported	by	experimental	research	on	slurring	words. 3.2 Nomen est Omen: The Important Role of Nouns If you go through a mental list of the slurs that you are familiar with,	you	will	probably	notice that	all	of them	belong to the	syntactic	category	of	nouns.	This is	peculiar,	given that	most	of	slurs'	neutral counterparts come in	both	nominal and	adjectival form (e.g., 'a homosexual'/'homosexual';	'a	Jew'/'Jewish';	notice	also	prepositional constructions	such	as	'someone	with homosexual	preferences',	'someone	from Mexico',	etc.).	A	complete	linguistic	theory	of	slurs	should	be able to	explain	this	systematic	pattern,	and	not treat it	as	a	mere	accident.	Interestingly,	this	syntactic	inflexibility	of	slurs	is,	too,	directly predicted	by	the	essentialist	theory.	That	is,	in	contrast	to	other	available	theories,	the	essentialist	theory	is	not	only	compatible	with,	but and	Maass	used	a	semantic priming task. They	presented	participants subliminally	with	a	prime	word	that	was	either	a	neutral	term	('gay'), a	derogatory	counterpart	term	('fag'),	or	a	nonsense	term	('secadftg'). Hence, the	participants	never consciously	noticed	with	which	word they	were	primed.	This is important,	as it	eliminates	the	risk	of	task interventions	by	conscious	higher-level	pragmatic	processes.	Following	the	prime,	the	participants	were	to	engage	in	a	lexical	decision	task. They	saw	a	target	word	that	was	either	a	trait	stereotypical	of	the	prime word	(e.g., 'elegant'	or 'effeminate'),	counterstereotypical	(e.g., 'energetic'	or	'intolerant'),	or	completely	unrelated	('honest'	or	'stingy').	Importantly,	half	of	the	traits	were	positively	valenced,	while	the	other half	of	the	target	words	was	negatively	valenced.	The	participants'	task was	to	make	a	lexical	word/nonword	decision	as	fast	as	possible.	The study	had	two	key	results.	First,	the	participants	reacted	significantly faster	to	stereotypical targets	than	to	counterstereotypical	or	unrelated targets, regardless of whether the prime	was neutral or derogatory. This	means	that	both	neutral	and	derogatory	category	representations immediately and automatically activate representations of the related stereotype	features.	Second,	the	authors	found	that	derogatory	labels were	again	significantly	less	likely	to	activate	flattering	associations	of the	social	group.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	derogatory	labels	resulted	in	the suppression	of	any	positively-valenced	stereotype,	giving	way for the negatively	valenced	associations	related	to	a	group.57 In	sum,	these	experiments	show	that	a)	slur	terms	encode	the	stereotype	associated	with	a	social	group,58	and	that	b)	this	stereotype	differs	in	valence	from	the	stereotype	encoded	in	the	neutral	counterpart, of	intermixed	high	and	low-level	processes.	This	requirement	was	satisfied	in Carnaghi	and	Maass'	follow	up	study. 57. In	a	later	study	(Carnaghi	&	Maass,	2007),	the	authors	successfully	replicated the	results,	speaking	to	the	robustness	of	their	findings. 58.	Needless	to	say,	this	research,	together	with	the	abundant	amount	of	research on	typicality	effects	originating	in	Eleanor	Rosch's	research	program	(Rosch, 1988), supports that typicality effects are robust and thus relatively stable among	subjects.	Even	critics	of	prototype	theory	often	describe	this	stability as	the	most	attractive	feature	of	prototype	theory	(Fodor,	1998). eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 22 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) 2003,	p.	188).	In	short,	nouns	intuitively	('a	racist',	'a	schizophrenic',	'a blonde',	'a	liar',	'a	homerun	hitter',	etc.)	impart	a	form	of	essentialism: The	property	that	is	nominalized	is	vital to	the	person's	identity	and	allows	for	a	variety	of	inductions.	Other	grammatical	forms,	such	as	adjectives	and	verb	constructions	('have	schizophrenia'/'schizophrenic', 'to	have	blond	hair'/'to	be	blond',	etc.)	rather	convey	mutable,	temporal	qualities	of	an	individual. That	nouns	are	much	stronger	in	their	essentialist-communicative potential	than	other	word	forms	has	received	much	empirical	support. In	one	study,	Susan	Gelman	and	Gail	Heyman	compared	the	inductive potential children infer from	noun	and	verb labels (Gelman	&	Heyman, 1999).	They	either	heard	a story that	contained "a	carrot	eater" (noun	phrase;	NP),	or	a story that talked	about someone	who "eats carrots	whenever	she	can"	(verb	phrase;	VP).	In	the	critical	part,	the children answered a set of questions that tested the stability of the properties:	e.g.,	"Will	Rose	eat	a	lot	of	carrots	when	she	is	grown	up?" or	"Would	Rose	eat	a	lot	of	carrots	if	she	grew	up	in	a	family	where no	one	liked	carrots?"	Children	in	the	NP	condition	predicted	significantly	more	often	that	the	property	in	question	would	be	more	stable over	time	and	in	adverse	environmental	conditions	than	children	in the	VP	condition.	Thus,	the	grammatical	form	of	a	noun	seems	to	suggest	to	a	child	that	a	category	is	to	be	thought	of	as	a	kind	(Gelman	& Heyman,	1999). Carnaghi	et	al.	(2008)	replicated	and	developed	the	experiments initiated by Gelman and Heyman. In multiple experiments testing adults, they compared the inductive potential of nouns and adjectives	which	assign	individuals	to	the	same	categories	(e.g.,	'an	athlete' vs.	'athletic').	They	found	that	describing	a	person	by	a	noun	triggers significantly	more	stereotypical	inferences	as	compared	to	an	adjectival description. Remarkably, nouns also inhibit inferences about behaviors or habits that are associatively rather incongruent	with the descriptors. For example, a person that is homosexual (adjective) was estimated to attend the church	more often than a homosexual (noun).	Moreover,	nouns	but	not	adjectives	inhibit the	possibility	of makes sense of the fact that	nouns are the	primary linguistic vehicle through	which	we	communicate	the	semantic	information	of	slurs. There	are	a	variety	of	different	linguistic	devices	by	means	of	which we	can	assign	an	individual	to	a	category.	Borrowing	an	example	from Wierzbicka (1986), consider the difference between the sentences "Anna	is	blond"	and	"Anna	is	a	blonde".	In	both	cases,	we	predicate	a property	(blondness) to	Anna,	and	thereby include	her in	the	set	of things	that	instantiate	blondness.	But	although	the	set-theoretic	operations	of	both	predicates	are	prima facie	identical,	a	closer	look	reveals that	there	are	big	disparities	in	the	information	conveyed	by	the	adjective	and	the	noun.	Whereas	the	former	predicate	'blond'	simply	refers to	a	quality	-	a	specific	hair	color	-	the	latter	predicate,	'a	blonde',	is	a sortal	that	refers	to	an	object,	or,	rather,	a	person	that	can	have	a	whole bunch	of	other	qualities.	Normally,	we	even	feel	compelled	to	make	a number	of	inferences	about	which	these	other	qualities	are	that	Anna, being	a	blonde,	has.	By	using	the	noun	rather	than	the	adjective,	the speaker	conveys	that	Anna	is	sexy	or	not	particularly	bright. Another	example,	adopted	from	Gelman	(2003),	is	a	case	in	point. The	Atlanta	baseball	player	John	Rocker	was	criticized	for	making	a racist	comment	in	an	interview.	When	an	ABC	News	reporter	asked him	directly,	"Are	you	a	racist?",	he	answered:	"Absolutely	not.	[...]	You hit	one	home	run	in	the	big	leagues,	it	doesn't	make	you	a	home	run hitter.	[...]	To	make	one	[racist]	comment	like	this	doesn't	make	you a	racist."	Although	Rocker's	argument	structure	seems	disputable	(to say	the	least),	it	does	tell	us	something	about	the	underlying	conceptual	difference	connected	to	a	noun	('a	homerun	hitter',	'a	racist')	and a	verb	phrase	('to	hit	a	home	run',	'to	make	a	racist	comment').	Importantly,	Rocker	himself	seems	to	take	for	granted	that	the	verbal	choice he	makes	directly	conveys	the	difference	in	meaning	between	'to	hit a	home	run'	and	to	be	'a	homerun	hitter'.	Whereas	the	first	choice	of syntactic	category	conveys	a	temporary	state	that	does	not	originate	in any	identifying	property	of	the	person,	the	latter	noun	form	implicates an	enduring, stable state that is central to the	person's identity and reliably	causes	a	number	of	other	properties	of the	person	(Gelman, eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 23 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) white	people	invented	him,	then	you	have	to	find	out	why. And	the	future	of	the	country	depends	on	that.	Whether or	not	it	is	able	to	ask	that	question.	(Baldwin,	1963)59 This	paper	was	an	attempt to	contribute to the	task	assigned	so	poignantly	by	Baldwin,	and	come	a	step	closer	to	an	answer	to	his	question. I	have	argued that the	central	mechanism	of slurs is	one	of	essentialization; slurs	are	akin to	kind terms that	denote	an	essence	of a social category	which	nomologically connects to	a set	of	negative stereotypical	features.	In	effect,	by	using	slurs,	or	even	having	them	in our	public	lexicon,	we	commit	to	a	way	of	carving	up	the	social	world that is dehumanizing and	gives groups	with the	dominant share	of social	power	a	tool	to	rationalize	and	maintain	the	oppressive	hierarchies	that	keep	down	marginalized	groups. To	illustrate	the	plausibility	of	the	essentialist	theory,	and	show	that it	does	interesting,	multi-layered	explanatory	work,	I	argued	that,	first, essentialism about slurs explains their recognized linguistic properties;	second,	that	the	essentialist	theory	receives	convergent	evidence from	cognitive	psychology;	and	third,	that	the	essentialist	theory	has unique	resources	to	explain	why	slurs	occur	predominantly	as	nouns. Importantly,	the	goal	of	this	paper	has	been	to	make	a	cumulative	case for	the	essentialist	theory	and	motivate	it	as	a	novel,	interesting	framework	that	takes	seriously	the	challenge	of	linking	prejudiced,	hateful, or	bigoted	language	to	cognition	and	explains	its	relation	to	social	oppression.	Although	one	might	disagree	with	the	assessment	of	some	of the	data,	it	is	important	to	note	that	my	view	does	not	stand	or	fall	on the	basis	of	a	single	piece	of	evidence.	Good	theories	should	predict and	account	for	a	wide range of	data.	This	paper	shows	that	the	essentialist	theory	does	precisely	that. 59.	Raoul	Peck's	documentary	film	I Am Not Your Negro	is	a	collage	based	on	the unfinished	manuscripts	of	Remember this House,	immersed	with interview	excerpts	by	Baldwin	and	a	variety	of	other	material	(Peck,	2016).	The	final	scene the	quote is based	on is originally from	a 1963 interview	of Baldwin	with Kenneth	Clar.	Note	that	the	invention	of	the	'nigger'	by	the	white	world	is	a re-occurring	theme	employed	by	Baldwin	(see,	e.g.,	Baldwin,	1963;	1969). alternative	classifications	altogether (i.e.,	not	only incongruent	ones). Once	someone	is	categorized	as	belonging	to	one	social	category,	e.g., 'artist',	participants	are	not	very	willing	to	assign	them	to	a	second	one, e.g., 'athlete'.	These	results	did	not	hold for	adjective	conditions,	because	nouns	as	opposed	to	adjectives	tend	to	convey	discrete	category boundaries	which	do	not	intersect	with	other	categories.	Finally,	when Carnaghi	et	al.	primed	subjects	with	an	essentialist	scenario,	participants	would	even	themselves	be	more	likely	to	use	a	noun	to	describe a	person. In	sum,	nouns,	adjectives,	and	verb	phrases	do	not	only	categorize individuals, but also tell us something about the particular	way in which	the	individuals	are	categorized.	In	the	case	of	adjectives,	the	individual	is	assigned	to	one	qualitative	category	among	many	potential others.	In	the	case	of	nouns,	the	individual	is	assigned	to	one	category that	identifies	the	individual	in	question	in	a	rather	all-or-nothing	way and	allows	for	rich	inferences	with	regard	to	qualities	that	(allegedly) come	along	with	the	stable	category	in	question. At	this	point,	it	should	be	clear	why	my	essentialist	theory	explains that	nouns	are the	main syntactic vehicle	of slurs.	According to	my theory,	slurs	encode	essentialist	information.	We	have	now	seen	that nouns	are the	primary linguistic	device	we	use to	convey that	a	category	is	essentialized.	So	if	the	semantics	of	slurs	is	essentialist,	nouns should be	the	primary	linguistic	vehicles	for	communicating	the	meaning	of slurs.	Thus, the	essentialist	account	uniquely	predicts	and	explains	this	striking	syntactic	pattern	of	slurs. Conclusion In the closing scene	of I Am Not Your Negro, James	Baldwin	offers a powerful,	penetrating	diagnosis	of	White	America: What	white	people	have	to	do,	is	try	to	find	out	in	their hearts	why	it	was	necessary	for	them	to	have	a	nigger	in the	first	place.	Because I	am	not	a	nigger. I'm	a	man. If I'm	not	the	nigger	here,	and	if	you	invented	him,	you	the eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 24 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) Bolinger, R.	J. (2017). The Pragmatics of Slurs.	Noûs, 51(3), 439–462. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12090 Camp,	E.	(2013).	Slurring	Perspectives.	Analytic Philosophy, 54(3),	330– 349.	https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12022 Camp,	E. (2018).	A	Dual	Act	Analysis	of	Slurs. In	D.	Sosa	(Ed.),	Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs,	29–58.	Oxford	University Press.	https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758655.003.0003 Carnaghi,	A.,	&	Maass,	A.	(2007).	In-Group	and	Out-Group	Perspectives	in	the	Use	of	Derogatory	Group	Labels:	Gay	Versus	Fag.	Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 26(2), 142–156. https://doi. org/10.1177/0261927X07300077 Carnaghi, A., & Maass, A. (2008). Derogatory Language in Intergroup	Context:	Are	"Gay"	and	"Fag"	Synonymous?	In	Y.	Kashima, K.	Fiedler,	&	P.	Freytag	(Eds.),	Stereotype Dynamics: Language-based Approaches to the Formation, Maintenance, and Transformation of Stereotypes,	117–134.	Lawrence	Erlbaum	Associates. Carnaghi, A., Maass, A., Gresta, S., Bianchi, M., Cadinu, M., & Arcuri, L. (2008). Nomina Sunt Omina: On the Inductive Potential of Nouns and Adjectives in Person Perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(5), 839–859. https://doi. org/10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.839 Cepollaro, B. (2017). The Semantics and Pragmatics of Slurs and Thick Terms.	PSL	Research	University. Cepollaro,	B.,	&	Stojanovic,	I.	(2016).	Hybrid	Evaluatives:	In	Defense of	a	Presuppositional	Account.	Grazer Philosophische Studien, 93(3), 458–488.	https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09303007 Chalik,	L.,	Leslie,	S.-J.,	&	Rhodes,	M.	(2017).	Cultural	Context	Shapes Essentialist	Beliefs	about	Religion.	Developmental Psychology, 53(6), 1178–1187.	https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0000301 Chomsky,	N. (2000).	New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. Cambridge	University	Press. Copp,	D.	(2009).	Realist-expressivism	and	Conventional	Implicature. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4,	167–202. Copping,	K.	E.,	Kurtz-Costes,	B.,	Rowley,	S.	J.,	&	Wood,	D.	(2013).	Age Bibliography Allport,	G.	W.	(1954).	The Nature of Prejudice.	Addison-Wesley.	https:// doi.org/10.1037/0708-5591.35.1.11 Anderson,	L.,	&	Lepore,	E.	(2013).	Slurring	Words.	Noûs, 47(1),	25–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00820.x Appiah,	K.	A. (1985).	The	Uncompleted	Argument:	Du	Bois and the Illusion	of	Race.	Critical Inquiry, 12(1),	21–37. Appiah,	K.	A.	(1996).	Race,	Culture,	Identity:	Misunderstood	Connections.	The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 17,	51–136. Appiah, K.	A. (2018). The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity. Liveright. Retrieved from https://books.google.com.au/ books?id=gR8zDwAAQBAJ Bach,	K.	(2018).	Loaded	Words:	On	the	Semantics	and	Pragmatics	of Slurs.	In	D.	Sosa	(Ed.),	Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs, 60–76.	Oxford	University	Press. Baldwin,	J.	(1963).	The Fire Next Time.	Dial	Press. Baldwin,	J.	(1969).	The	Nigger	We	Invent.	Equity & Excellence in Education, 7(2),	15–23.	https://doi.org/10.1080/0020486690070203 Bastian,	B.,	&	Haslam,	N.	(2006).	Psychological	Essentialism	and	Stereotype	Endorsement.	Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(2), 228–235.	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.03.003 Basu,	R.	(2019).	What	We	Epistemically	Owe	To	Each	Other.	Philosophical Studies, 176(4),	1–17.	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1219-z Bero,	S.	(2017).	Responsibility and the Emotional Structure of Relationships. PhD	Dissertation,	University	of	Southern	California. Bessenoff,	G.	R.,	&	Sherman,	J.	W.	(2000).	Automatic	and	Controlled Components of Prejudice Toward Fat People: Evaluation Versus Stereotype	Activation.	Social Cognition, 18(4),	329–353.	https://doi. org/10.1521/soco.2000.18.4.329 Block, N. (1987). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10(1), 615–678. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 25 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) Controlled	Components.	Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(1),	5–18.	https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5 Diesing,	M.	(1992).	Indefinites.	MIT	Press. Dovidio, J.	F., Evans, N., & Tyler, R.	B. (1986). Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of their Cognitive Representations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22(1), 22–37. https://doi. org/10.1016/0022-1031(86)90039-9 Dovidio, J.	F.,	Glick,	P.	S.,	&	Rudman,	L.	A. (Eds.). (2005).	On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years after Allport. Blackwell. https://doi. org/10.1002/9780470773963 Eberhardt, J.	L., Goff, P.	A., Purdie, V.	J.,	&	Davies, P.	G. (2004). Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(6), 876–893. https://doi. org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.6.876 Fodor,	J.	(1998).	Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.	Oxford University	Press. Fodor, J. (2005). Hume Variations. Clarendon Press. https://doi. org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287338.001.0001 Fodor,	J.,	&	Lepore,	E.	(1992).	Holism: A Shopper's Guide.	Blackwell. Fodor,	J.,	&	Pylyshyn,	Z.	W.	(2014).	Minds Without Meanings: An Essay on the Content of Concepts.	MIT	Press. Gaertner,	S.	L.,	&	McLaughlin,	J.	P.	(1983).	Racial	Stereotypes:	Associations	and	Ascriptions	of	Positive	and	Negative	Characteristics.	Social Psychology Quarterly, 46(1),	23–30.	https://doi.org/10.2307/3033657 Gärdenfors,	P.	(2000).	Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought.	MIT Press. Gelman,	S.	A.	(2003).	The Essential Child: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Thought.	Oxford	University	Press. Gelman,	S.	A. (2004).	Psychological	Essentialism in	Children.	Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(9), 404–409. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. tics.2004.07.001 Gelman,	S.	A.,	Collman,	P.,	&	Maccoby,	E.	E.	(1986).	Inferring	Properties from	Categories	Versus Inferring	Categories from	Properties: and	Race	Differences	in	Racial	Stereotype	Awareness	and	Endorsement. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 43(5), 971–980. https:// doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12061 Croom,	A.	M.	(2011).	Slurs.	Language Sciences, 33(3),	343–358.	https:// doi.org/10.1016/J.LANGSCI.2010.11.005 Croom,	A.	M.	(2014a).	Remarks	on	"The	Semantics	of	Racial	Slurs".	Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, 13,	11–32. Croom, A.	M. (2014b). Spanish Slurs and Stereotypes for MexicanAmericans	in	the	USA:	A	Context-sensitive	Account	of	Derogation and	Appropriation.	Pragmática Sociocultural / Sociocultural Pragmatics, 8(2),	145–179.	https://doi.org/10.1515/soprag-2014-0007 Croom,	A.	M. (2015). The Semantics of Slurs: A	Refutation of	Coreferentialism. Ampersand, 2, 30–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/J. AMPER.2015.01.001 Cvencek,	D.,	Meltzoff,	A.	N.,	&	Greenwald,	A.	G.	(2011).	Math-Gender Stereotypes in Elementary School Children. Child Development, 82(3),	766–779.	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01529.x Cvencek,	D.,	Nasir,	N.	S.,	O'Connor,	K.,	Wischnia,	S.,	&	Meltzoff,	A.	N. (2015). The Development of Math-Race Stereotypes: "They Say Chinese	People	Are	the	Best	at	Math".	Journal of Research on Adolescence, 25(4),	630–637.	https://doi.org/10.1111/jora.12151 Danks,	D.	(2014).	Unifying the Mind: Cognitive Representations as Graphical Models.	MIT	Press. Del Pinal, G. (2016). Prototypes as Compositional Components of Concepts. Synthese, 193(9), 2899–2927. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11229-015-0892-0 Del Pinal, G. (2018). Meaning, Modulation, and Context: A Multidimensional Semantics for Truth-conditional Pragmatics. Linguistics and Philosophy, 41(2), 165–207. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10988-017-9221-z Demoulin, S., Leyens, J.-P., & Yzerbyt, V. (2006). Lay Theories of Essentialism. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9(1), 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430206059856 Devine,	P.	G.	(1989).	Stereotypes	and	Prejudice:	Their	Automatic	and eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 26 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) of Group Perception: Perceived Variability, Entitativity, and Essentialism, 61–78.	Psychology	Press.	https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203644973 Haslanger,	S.	(2011).	Ideology,	Generics,	and	Common	Ground.	In	C. Witt (Ed.),	Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in the Ontology of Sex, Gender and the Self, 179–207. Springer Netherlands. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-90-481-3783-1_11 Heim, I., & Kratzer, A. (1998). Semantics in Generative Grammar. Blackwell. Hirschfeld,	L.	A.	(1995).	Do	Children	Have	a	Theory	of	Race?	Cognition, 54(2),	209–252.	https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(95)91425-R Hirschfeld,	L.	A. (1996).	Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture, and the Child's Construction of Human Kinds.	MIT	Press. Ho, A.	K., Roberts, S.	O., & Gelman, S.	A. (2015). Essentialism and Racial	Bias	Jointly	Contribute	to	the	Categorization	of	Multiracial Individuals. Psychological Science, 26(10), 1639–1645. https://doi. org/10.1177/0956797615596436 Hom,	C.	(2008).	The	Semantics	of	Racial	Epithets.	Journal of Philosophy, 105(8),	416–440.	https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2008105834 Hom,	C.	(2010).	Pejoratives.	Philosophy Compass, 5(2),	164–185.	https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00274.x Hom,	C.,	&	May,	R.	(2013).	Moral	and	Semantic	Innocence.	Analytic Philosophy, 54(3),	293–313.	https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12020 Hom,	C.,	&	May,	R.	(2015).	Pejoratives	as	Fiction.	In	D.	Sosa	(Ed.),	Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs, 108–130.	Oxford	University	Press. Hornsby, J. (2001).	Meaning and	Uselessness:	How to Think about Derogatory Words. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 25(1), 128–141. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4975.00042 Howell, A.	J.,	Weikum, B.	A.,	&	Dyck, H.	L. (2011). Psychological Essentialism and its Association with Stigmatization. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(1), 95–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. paid.2010.09.006 The	Case	of	Gender.	Child Development, 57(2),	396–404.	https://doi. org/10.2307/1130595 Gelman, S.	A.,	&	Heyman,	G.	D. (1999). Carrot-Eaters and	CreatureBelievers: The Effects of Lexicalization on Children's Inferences About Social Categories. Psychological Science, 10(6), 489–493. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00194 Gelman,	S.	A.,	&	Wellman,	H.	M. (1991). Insides	and	Essences:	Early Understandings of the Non-obvious. Cognition, 38(3), 213–244. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(91)90007-Q Gil‐White,	F.	J. (2001).	Are	Ethnic	Groups	Biological "Species" to the Human Brain? Current Anthropology, 42(4), 515–553. https://doi. org/10.1086/321802 Goff,	P.	A.,	Eberhardt,	J.	L.,	Williams,	M.	J.,	&	Jackson,	M.	C.	(2008).	Not Yet	Human:	Implicit	Knowledge,	Historical	Dehumanization,	and Contemporary	Consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(2),	292–306.	https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.292 Harman,	G.	(1993).	Holism:	A	Consumer	Update.	Grazer Philosophische Studien, 46,	163–171.	https://doi.org/10.5840/gps1993467 Haslam, N. (2000). Psychiatric Categories as Natural Kinds: Essentialist Thinking about Mental Disorders. Social Research, 67(4), 1031–1058. Haslam, N., & Ernst, D. (2002). Essentialist Beliefs About Mental Disorders. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 21(6), 628–644. https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.21.6.628.22793 Haslam, N., & Levy, S.	R. (2006). Essentialist Beliefs About Homosexuality: Structure and Implications for Prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(4), 471–485. https://doi. org/10.1177/0146167205276516 Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2000). Essentialist Beliefs about	Social	Categories.	The British Journal of Social Psychology, 39 (Pt 1)(1),	113–127.	https://doi.org/10.1348/014466600164363 Haslam,	N.,	Rothschild,	L.,	&	Ernst,	D.	(2004).	Essentialism	and	Entitativity:	Structures	of	Beliefs	about	the	Ontology	of	Social	Categories.	In	V.	Yzerbyt,	C.	M.	Judd,	&	O.	Corneille	(Eds.),	The Psychology eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 27 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) Livingstone	Smith,	D. (2011).	Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others.	St.	Martin's	Press. Mahalingam,	R.	(2003).	Essentialism,	Culture,	and	Power:	Representations	of	Social	Class.	Journal of Social Issues, 59(4),	733–749.	https:// doi.org/10.1046/j.0022-4537.2003.00087.x Marconi,	D.	(1997).	Lexical Competence.	MIT	Press. McCawley,	J.	D.	(1972).	A	Program	for	Logic.	In	D.	Davidson	&	G.	Harman	(Eds.),	Semantics of Natural Language,	498–544.	Springer	Netherlands.	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_18 Medin,	D. (1989).	Concepts	and	Conceptual	Structure.	The American Psychologist, 44(12),	1469–1481. Medin, D., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological Essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning,	179–195.	Cambridge	University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1017/ cbo9780511529863.009 Mullen,	B.,	&	Leader,	T.	(2005).	Linguistic	Factors:	Antilocutions,	Ethnonyms,	Ethnophaulisms,	and	Other	Varieties	of	Hate	Speech.	In J.	F. Dovidio, P.	S.	Glick,	& L.	A. Rudman (Eds.),	On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport, 192–207. Blackwell. https://doi. org/10.1002/9780470773963.ch12 Murphy,	G.	L.	(2004).	The Big Book of Concepts.	MIT	Press. Nunberg,	G.	(2018).	The	Social	Life	of	Slurs.	In	D.	Fogal,	D.	W.	Harris,	& M.	Moss	(Eds.),	New Work on Speech Acts,	237–293.	Oxford	University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198738831.003.0010 Pascoe,	C.	J.	(2012).	Dude, You're a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School.	University	of	California	Press. Pauker, K., Ambady, N., & Apfelbaum, E.	P. (2010). Race Salience and Essentialist Thinking in Racial Stereotype Development. Child Development, 81(6), 1799–1813. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01511.x Pauker, K., Xu, Y.,	Williams,	A.,	&	Biddle,	A.	M. (2016). Race Essentialism and Social Contextual Differences in Children's Racial Stereotyping. Child Development, 87(5), 1409–1422. https://doi. org/10.1111/cdev.12592 Jeshion, R. (2013a). Expressivism and the Offensiveness of Slurs. Philosophical Perspectives, 27(1), 231–259. https://doi.org/10.1111/ phpe.12027 Jeshion,	R. (2013b). Slurs and Stereotypes.	Analytic Philosophy, 54(3), 314–329.	https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12021 Jeshion, R. (2018). Slurs, Dehumanization, and the Expression of Contempt.	In	D.	Sosa	(Ed.),	Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs, 77–104. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/ oso/9780198758655.003.0005 Jönsson,	M.	L. (2017). Interpersonal Sameness of	Meaning for Inferential	Role	Semantics.	Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46(3),	269–297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-016-9400-3 Kamp, H., & Partee, B. (1995). Prototype Theory and Compositionality. Cognition, 57(2), 129–191. https://doi. org/10.1016/0010-0277(94)00659-9 Knobe, J., Prasada, S., & Newman, G.	E. (2013). Dual Character Concepts and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation. Cognition, 127(2), 242–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. cognition.2013.01.005 Lakoff,	G.	(1987).	Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind.	University	of	Chicago	Press. Leslie,	S.-J.	(2013).	Essence	and	Natural	Kinds:	When	Science	Meets Preschooler Intuition. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 4, 108–166. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001 Leslie,	S.-J.	(2015).	"Hillary	Clinton	is	the	Only	Man	in	the	Obama	Administration":	Dual	Character	Concepts,	Generics,	and	Gender.	Analytic Philosophy, 56(2),	111–141.	https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12063 Leslie,	S.-J.	(2017).	The	Original	Sin	of	Cognition:	Fear,	Prejudice,	and Generalization. Journal of Philosophy, 114(8), 393–421. https://doi. org/10.5840/jphil2017114828 Levy, S.	R., & Dweck, C.	S. (1999). The Impact of Children's Static Versus Dynamic Conceptions of People on Stereotype Formation. Child Development, 70(5), 1163–1180. https://doi. org/10.1111/1467-8624.00085 eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 28 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) (Eds.), Readings in Cognitive Science, a Perspective from Psychology and Artificial Intelligence,	312–322.	Elsevier.	https://doi.org/10.1016/ B978-1-4832-1446-7.50028-5 Schlenker,	P.	(2007).	Expressive	Presuppositions.	Theoretical Linguistics, 33(2),	237–245.	https://doi.org/10.1515/TL.2007.017 Sennet,	A.,	&	Copp,	D.	(2015).	What	Kind	of	a	Mistake	is	it	to	Use	a	Slur? Philosophical Studies, 172(4), 1079–1104. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11098-014-0338-4 Sloman,	S.	(2005).	Causal Models.	Oxford	University	Press.	https://doi. org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001 Sloman,	S.,	Love,	B.	C.,	&	Ahn,	W.-K. (1998).	Feature	Centrality	and Conceptual Coherence.	Cognitive Science, 22(2), 189–228. https:// doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2202_2 Smith,	E.	E.,	Medin,	D.	L.,	&	Rips,	L.	J.	(1984).	A	Psychological	Approach to	Concepts:	Comments	on	Rey's	"Concepts	and	Stereotypes".	Cognition, 17(3),	265–274.	https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(84)90010-6 Soames,	S.	(2007).	What	Are	Natural	Kinds?	Philosophical Topics, 35(1), 329–342.	https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2007351/215 Soames,	S.	(2010).	Philosophy of Language.	Princeton	University	Press. Soames,	S. (2015).	Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning.	Princeton University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400866335 Strawson,	P.	F.	(1963).	Introduction to Logical Theory.	Routledge. Taylor,	J.	R.	(2009).	Linguistic Categorization.	Oxford	University	Press. Toosi,	N.	R.,	&	Ambady,	N. (2011).	Ratings	of Essentialism for Eight Religious	Identities.	International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 21(1),	17–29.	https://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2011.532441 Verkuyten,	M.	(2003).	Discourses	about	Ethnic	Group	(De-)essentialism: Oppressive	and	Progressive	Aspects.	British Journal of Social Psychology, 42(3),	371–391.	https://doi.org/10.1348/014466603322438215 von	Fintel,	K.	(2009).	Would	You	Believe	it?	The	King	of	France	is	Back! (Presuppositions	and	Truth-value Intuitions). In	A.	Bezuidenhout &	M.	Reimer	(Eds.),	Descriptions and Beyond,	269–296.	Oxford	University	Press. Peck,	R.	(2016).	I Am Not Your Negro.	Velvet	Film,	Inc. Popa-Wyatt, M. (2016). Not All Slurs are Equal. Phenomenology and Mind, 11, 150–156. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.13128/ Phe_Mi-20115 Potts, C. (2004). The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:o so/9780199273829.001.0001 Potts, C. (2007). The Expressive Dimension. Theoretical Linguistics, 33(2),	165–198.	https://doi.org/10.1515/TL.2007.011 Prentice, D.	A., & Miller, D.	T. (2006). Essentializing Differences between Women and Men. Psychological Science, 17(2), 129–135. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01675.x Prentice,	D.	A.,	&	Miller,	D.	T. (2007). Psychological Essentialism of Human	Categories.	Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16(4), 202–206.	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00504.x Prinz, J.	J. (2012). Regaining Composure: A Defence Of Prototype Compositionality.	In	W.	Hinzen,	M.	Werning,	&	E.	Machery	(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality,	437–453.	Oxford	University Press.	https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199541072.013.0021 Putnam,	H.	(1975).	The	Meaning	of	"Meaning".	Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7,	131–193. Rehder,	B.	(2017).	Concepts	as	Causal	Models.	In	M.	R.	Waldmann	(Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning,	347–413.	Oxford	University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199399550.013.39 Rey,	G.	(1983).	Concepts	and	Stereotypes.	Cognition, 15(1–3),	237–262. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90044-6 Rice,	D.	R.,	Abrams,	D.,	Badea,	C.,	Bohner,	G.,	Carnaghi,	A.,	Dementi, L.	I.,	... Trzebinski, J. (2010).	What	Did You Just Call	Me? European	and	American	Ratings	of the	Valence	of	Ethnophaulisms. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 29(1),	117–131.	https://doi. org/10.1177/0261927X09351696 Richard,	M.	(2008).	When Truth Gives Out.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239955.001.0001 Rosch,	E.	(1988).	Principles	of	Categorization.	In	A.	Collins	&	E.	Smith eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs philosophers'	imprint – 29 – vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019) Wang, S.	S., Brownell, K.	D.,	&	Wadden, T.	A. (2004). The Influence of the Stigma of Obesity on	Overweight Individuals. International Journal of Obesity, 28(10), 1333–1337. https://doi.org/10.1038/ sj.ijo.0802730 Whiting,	D. (2013). It's	Not	What	You	Said, It's the	Way	You	Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures. Analytic Philosophy, 54(3), 364–377.	https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12024 Wierzbicka,	A.	(1986).	What's	in	a	Noun?	(Or:	How	Do	Nouns	Differ in	Meaning	from	Adjectives?).	Studies in Language, 10(2),	353–389. https://doi.org/10.1075/sl.10.2.05wie Williams, M.	J., & Eberhardt, J.	L. (2008). Biological Conceptions of Race and the Motivation to Cross Racial Boundaries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(6), 1033–1047. https://doi. org/10.1037/0022-3514.94.6.1033 Williamson,	T.	(2009).	Reference,	Inference,	and	the	Semantics	of	Pejoratives.	In	J.	Almog	&	P.	Leonardi	(Eds.),	The Philosophy of David Kaplan,	137–158.	Oxford	University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1093/ acprof:oso/9780195367881.003.0009 Woods, T.	A., Kurtz-Costes, B.,	& Rowley, S.	J. (2005). The	Development	of	Stereotypes	about	the	Rich	and	Poor:	Age,	Race,	and	Family Income	Differences in Beliefs. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 34(5),	437–445.	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-005-7261-0 Zack,	N.	(2002).	Philosophy of Science and Race.	Routledge.